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LOSING HOLD OF THE GUIDING HAND: INEFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN JUVENILE DELINQUENCY 
REPRESENTATION 
by 
Barbara Fedders∗ 
Lawyers for children in juvenile delinquency proceedings frequently 
provide their clients deficient representation. In addition to failing to 
investigate the facts of a case and research the applicable law, they ignore 
relevant ethical mandates and fail to address the demands created by the 
unique characteristics of children. The widespread nature of 
substandard legal representation, combined with delinquent 
adjudications’ serious and long-term consequences, makes it imperative 
that juveniles harmed by deficient legal representation have access to 
some form of legal redress. Yet, at present, no such remedy exists. A child 
who is adjudicated delinquent can theoretically bring a claim of 
ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC), which, if granted, results in a 
new adjudicatory or dispositional hearing or a plea withdrawal. In 
practice, however, systemic and doctrinal barriers prevent children from 
filing IAC claims and from receiving appellate review of those claims. As 
a recent survey of IAC claims in delinquency cases suggests, children file 
these claims in an extremely small number of cases. Moreover, courts 
almost never grant relief on the basis of these claims. This form of 
appellate review fails to provide meaningful remedies to the large number 
of children harmed by substandard legal representation. Although 
commentators have explored this problem in the context of adult criminal 
defendants, this Article is among the first to examine the inadequacy of 
the IAC remedy for juveniles. It traces the history of the grant of the right 
to counsel to juveniles; analyzes substandard representation’s nature, 
causes, and extent; details systemic and doctrinal barriers facing 
juveniles who wish to file IAC claims; and offers preliminary proposals 
for reform. 
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“[The juvenile] requires the guiding hand of counsel at every step in the 
proceedings against him.”** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
This Article explores the widespread occurrence of deficient legal 
representation in juvenile court and the absence of any meaningful 
remedy to this problem. In 1967, the U.S. Supreme Court issued In re 
Gault, holding that the assistance of counsel was “essential” in juvenile 
delinquency cases that could end in confinement for a child.1 Appalled at 
the frequent disregard of rudimentary due process standards by juvenile 
court judges, the Gault Court ruled that the Fourteenth Amendment 
required that children and youth charged with criminal offenses in 
 
** In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (Fortas, J.) (1967) (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 
U.S. 45, 69 (1932)). 
1 Id. at 36–37. 
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juvenile court were entitled to a number of legal protections.2 Among 
these, the right to counsel was most notable.3 Some forty years later, the 
routinely substandard quality of the legal representation provided by 
lawyers in juvenile court has undermined the significance of the right.4 
Children and youth who are adjudicated delinquent—juvenile court 
terminology for being criminally convicted—confront a number of 
serious short- and long-term negative consequences.5 They may, for 
instance, be confined in state facilities for many years.6 Beyond the life of 
 
2 Id. at 41–42, 56 (holding that juveniles have right to notice of charges, to 
counsel, to confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses, and to privilege against 
self-incrimination). 
3 See, e.g., Tamar R. Birckhead, Toward a Theory of Procedural Justice for Juveniles, 57 
BUFF. L. REV. 1447, 1458 n.36 (2009) (citing articles praising Gault’s holding that 
children facing criminal charges have a right to counsel). 
4 See PATRICIA PURITZ ET AL., ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR., A CALL FOR JUSTICE: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY 
PROCEEDINGS (1995) (documenting deficient representation in juvenile courts 
around the country); ABA PRESIDENTIAL WORKING GROUP ON THE UNMET LEGAL NEEDS 
OF CHILDREN & THEIR FAMILIES, AMERICA’S CHILDREN AT RISK: A NATIONAL AGENDA FOR 
LEGAL ACTION (1993) (noting lack of competent representation in juvenile courts 
throughout the country); Wallace J. Mlyniec, In re Gault at 40: The Right to Counsel in 
Juvenile Court—A Promise Unfulfilled, 44 CRIM. L. BULL. 371, 381–82, 39 (2008) 
(discussing findings of sixteen state-wide assessments of juvenile courts conducted by 
National Juvenile Defender Center and noting that their findings indicate that “at the 
time they were done, competent lawyering was the exception rather than the norm in 
juvenile court of those states”); Susanne M. Bookser, Note, Making Gault Meaningful: 
Access to Counsel and Quality of Representation in Delinquency Proceedings for Indigent Youth, 
3 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 297 (2004) (noting juvenile courts’ common 
characteristics detailed in state reports regarding the quality of counsel). 
5 Where this Article uses the term “juvenile,” it refers to those children and 
youth under the jurisdiction of their state’s juvenile delinquency court. Most states 
end juvenile court jurisdiction at age eighteen or seventeen. Tamar R. Birckhead, 
North Carolina, Juvenile Court Jurisdiction, and the Resistance to Reform, 86 N.C. L. REV. 
1443, 1445 nn.1 & 3 (2008). Many states refer to courts that handle juvenile cases as 
“family courts.” See, e.g., N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 113 (McKinney 2008) (“The family court 
of the state of New York is established in each county of the state as part of the 
unified court system for the state.”). This Article will describe these courts as “juvenile 
courts,” the term by which they are more commonly known. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS 
ANN. ch. 218, § 57 (West 2005) (establishing territorial divisions in the juvenile court 
system); and N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-1501 (2009) (defining “juvenile court”). All states 
provide for circumstances in which minors can be tried as adults and deficient 
representation problems permeate that context. HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA 
SICKMUND, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 
NATIONAL REPORT 110 (2006); John Johnson Kerbs, (Un)equal Justice: Juvenile Court 
Abolition and African Americans, 564 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 109 (1999). 
However, the reasons for and implications of those problems are distinguishable 
from the problems detailed here, and are therefore beyond the scope of this Article. 
6 See, e.g., Barry C. Feld, A Century of Juvenile Justice: A Work in Progress or a 
Revolution that Failed?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 189, 253–54 (2007) (noting that beginning in 
the late 1980s, juvenile courts developed a more punitive nature). Many states have 
changed their juvenile codes to place a stronger emphasis on punishment. See, e.g., 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-2-102(1) (2009) (to protect the public, the juvenile system “will 
appropriately sanction juveniles who violate the law”). 
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the case, they face so-called “collateral” consequences that can hinder 
their chances at productive and law-abiding lives.7 The pervasiveness of 
substandard legal representation, combined with the high stakes of 
delinquent adjudications, makes it imperative that juveniles harmed by 
this representation have access to some form of legal redress. Yet, at 
present, no such remedy exists.8 
In theory, a child who is adjudicated delinquent and given a 
disposition pursuant to deficient representation can bring an appellate 
claim based on an argument that her trial counsel provided ineffective 
assistance of counsel (IAC).9 If an appellate court ruled favorably on such 
a claim, the relief granted would be a new adjudicatory or dispositional 
hearing; it could also allow a child to withdraw her plea of delinquency.10 
However, systemic and doctrinal barriers work to prevent children from 
filing IAC claims and from having such claims fairly considered.11 As a 
recently conducted survey of IAC claims in delinquency cases indicates, 
these claims are filed in an extremely small number of cases and are 
almost never granted. It does not appear that they provide meaningful 
relief to the large number of children harmed by substandard legal 
representation.12 
 
7 Collateral consequences are not part of the disposition imposed by a court but 
consequences that flow from the fact of an adjudication. See Michael Pinard, The 
Logistical and Ethical Difficulties of Informing Juveniles About the Collateral Consequences of 
Adjudications, 6 NEV. L.J. 1111, 1114–15 (2006) [hereinafter Pinard, Difficulties] 
(describing how delinquent adjudications negatively affect children’s future 
education, housing and employment opportunities, and may serve as a basis for 
enhanced sentences if juveniles are convicted of crimes as adults); Michael Pinard, An 
Integrated Perspective on the Collateral Consequences of Criminal Convictions and Reentry 
Issues Faced by Formerly Incarcerated Individuals, 86 B.U. L. REV. 623, 634–35 (2006) 
[hereinafter Pinard, Integrated Perspective]. 
8 Feld, supra note 6, at 220 (noting dearth of juvenile appeals and describing 
juvenile justice process as “nearly incapable of correcting its own errors”). 
9 Courts have long held that the entitlement to the assistance of legal counsel is 
the entitlement to effective assistance of counsel. McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 
771 n.14 (1970); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 71 (1932). See Ellen Marrus, Effective 
Assistance of Counsel in the Wonderland of “Kiddie Court”—Why the Queen of Hearts Trumps 
Strickland, 39 CRIM. L. BULL. 393, 393 n.4 (2003) (summarizing reported cases where 
appellate courts heard juvenile IAC claims). 
10 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (outlining two-prong test 
that defendant must meet in establish ineffective assistance such that conviction or 
death sentence will be reversed); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985) (holding 
that Strickland v. Washington test applies to withdrawal of guilty pleas based on 
ineffective assistance of counsel). 
11 N. Lee Cooper et al., Fulfilling the Promise of In re Gault: Advancing the Role of 
Lawyers for Children, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 651, 674–75 (1998) (noting that practice 
of taking appeals of juvenile delinquency cases is lacking in most jurisdictions); 
Steven A. Drizin & Greg Luloff, Are Juvenile Courts a Breeding Ground for Wrongful 
Convictions?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 257, 294–99 (2007) (no “active and zealous” appellate 
or post-conviction practice in juvenile court); Marrus, supra note 9, at 417–19 
(describing hurdles to prevailing on IAC claim presented by legal standard). 
12 See discussion infra Part IV.C (detailing survey results and methodology). 
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The problem of widespread deficient legal representation plagues 
adult criminal courts as well.13 Adults convicted of crimes pursuant to 
such representation face similar obstacles to those faced by juveniles in 
obtaining relief through IAC claims. Legal scholars have extensively 
explored the obstacles facing adults.14 They have proposed such reforms 
as creating a more stringent legal standard for assessing the adequacy of 
trial attorney performance,15 extending the right to counsel to collateral 
review proceedings,16 and allowing appellate attorneys on direct appeal to 
supplement the trial court record to bring and adequately support claims 
of ineffectiveness on direct appeal.17 By contrast, the unique problems 
facing juveniles harmed by substandard representation have gone almost 
entirely unexamined.18 
This Article strives to address this vacuum. It explores the nature and 
pervasiveness of substandard legal representation, considers the causes of 
such representation, and examines the inadequacy of the IAC claim as a 
remedy for the resulting harm. Finally, it offers preliminary proposals 
toward reform that would allow juveniles both to file IAC claims and to 
have them fairly considered by reviewing courts. 
Part II offers a critical appraisal of Gault.19 While Gault granted legal 
protections designed to eliminate the procedural arbitrariness that 
characterized the pre-Gault juvenile court, the right to counsel as framed 
by the opinion is in many respects inadequate to the task of ensuring due 
process. For example, the right to counsel for children in delinquency 
proceedings is more limited in scope than the comparable adult right.20 
 
13 See, e.g., Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defender for the 21st 
Century, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 81 (1995); William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy 
Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 1 (1997). 
14 See, e.g., Martin C. Calhoun, Note, How to Thread the Needle: Toward a Checklist-
Based Standard for Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO. L.J. 413 
(1988); Jeffrey L. Kirchmeier, Drink, Drugs, and Drowsiness: The Constitutional Right to 
Effective Assistance of Counsel and the Strickland Prejudice Requirement, 75 NEB. L. REV. 
425, 439 (1996); Richard Klein, The Constitutionalization of Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel, 58 MD. L. REV. 1433, 1467 (1999); Robert R. Rigg, The Constitution, 
Compensation, and Competence: A Case Study, 27 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (1999). 
15 Bruce A. Green, Lethal Fiction: The Meaning of “Counsel” in the Sixth Amendment, 
78 IOWA L. REV. 433, 503 (1993) (arguing for a redefinition of “counsel” to include 
only skilled practitioners in criminal cases rather than any licensed attorneys). 
16 Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Litigation of Ineffective Assistance Claims: Some 
Uncomfortable Reflections on Massaro v. United States, 42 BRANDEIS L.J. 793, 801–02 
(2004). 
17 Eve Brensike Primus, Structural Reform in Criminal Defense: Relocating Ineffective 
Assistance of Counsel Claims, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 679, 682 (2007). 
18 A Westlaw search uncovered only two articles that addressed IAC claims in 
delinquency cases in any length: Marrus, supra note 9, and Drizin & Luloff, supra note 
11. 
19 387 U.S. 1 (1967). 
20 See Marsha Levick & Neha Desai, Still Waiting: The Elusive Quest to Ensure 
Juveniles a Constitutional Right to Counsel at All Stages of the Juvenile Court Process, 60 
RUTGERS L. REV. 175, 184–90 (2007) (describing the scope of adult and juvenile rights 
to counsel). 
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Additionally, the Court failed to consider whether and how juveniles’ 
cognitive and psychosocial underdevelopment would affect their ability 
to exercise their newly granted rights.21 Similarly, the Court did not 
address whether attorneys in juvenile court would have any special ethical 
responsibilities given that their clients tend to be, relative to adult 
defendants, cognitively underdeveloped and immature. Part II argues 
that Gault did not thus establish the parameters of effective assistance of 
counsel. Further, by declining to address whether juveniles have a right 
to the transcript of the proceedings or a right to appeal, Gault also failed 
to ensure that children aggrieved by IAC would have an appellate 
remedy.22 
Part III examines the nature and pervasiveness of substandard legal 
representation in juvenile court. Drawing primarily on recent assessments 
of juvenile defense systems conducted by the National Juvenile Defender 
Center, an organization that provides training and technical assistance to 
attorneys for youths in delinquency proceedings,23 Part III presents an 
overview of the deficient lawyering that occurs regularly in juvenile courts 
across the country. This Part also explains how substandard 
representation can lead to significant and lifelong negative consequences 
for children and adolescents harmed by it. Finally, Part III suggests 
reasons that substandard representation appears endemic in juvenile 
court. These reasons include many factors that contribute to substandard 
representation in adult criminal court, which are discussed here briefly, 
but Part III focuses on those factors that are unique to juvenile practice. 
Part IV considers the viability of the IAC remedy for juveniles 
harmed by substandard representation. It explains the legal doctrine 
governing a reviewing court’s consideration of IAC claims and the 
mechanics of filing them. It outlines the types of arguments a juvenile 
might make to support her claim of ineffective assistance—some of which 
are similar to those an adult might file, and some of which are age-
specific and thus unique to juveniles. It surveys the extremely low 
number of IAC claims filed over a ten-year period, which provides 
support for this Part’s suggestion that IAC claims do not constitute a 
meaningful form of relief. Part IV argues that the legal doctrine and rules 
governing IAC claims create nearly insurmountable hurdles for juveniles. 
While these obstacles are similar to those that face adult criminal 
defendants seeking to file IAC claims, Part IV explores how the rules and 
case law governing juvenile appeals make accessing the appellate system 
 
21 Donna M. Bishop & Hillary B. Farber, Joining the Legal Significance of Adolescent 
Developmental Capacities with the Legal Rights Provided by In Re Gault, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 
125, 135–36 (2007) (“In essence, Gault placed the expectation on children to access 
and exercise due process rights in the same way adult criminal defendants are 
expected to. The Court erred in failing to recognize that procedures that succeed in 
securing fairness for adults may not be sufficient to secure fairness for children.”). 
22 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 58. 
23 National Juvenile Defender Center, About Us, http://www.njdc.info/about 
_us.php. 
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via an IAC claim particularly difficult for juveniles. Part IV offers 
preliminary proposals for reform that would enhance a juvenile’s ability 
to file an IAC claim and to have it fairly considered. 
The Article concludes by noting that in addition to providing relief 
to juveniles on an individual basis, IAC claims can also have some impact, 
albeit limited, on the system-wide problem of deficient representation in 
juvenile court. It therefore urges that child advocates include among 
their advocacy demands and goals a call for reform of the system of filing 
IAC claims. 
II. THE PROMISE AND UNREALIZED POTENTIAL OF GAULT 
Before considering substandard legal representation in juvenile 
court, and the inadequacy of the IAC remedy to address the harm that 
results from it, it is first necessary to understand how children and 
adolescents in that court came to be entitled to legal representation. This 
Part briefly traces the development of the modern juvenile court, 
focusing on the procedural arbitrariness generated by its emphasis on 
flexibility and informality as well as on its hostility to lawyers. 
Responding to widespread criticism of that arbitrariness, Gault 
provided juveniles with due process protections, including the right to 
counsel.24 The extension of the right to counsel to children was 
unprecedented and dramatic. Yet the opinion did little to ensure that the 
legal counsel rendered would in fact be effective, or that children would 
have an appellate remedy if it were not.  
A. Before Gault: “To Protect Children from the Law, Not to Bring More Law to 
 Bear on Them”25 
Just over a hundred years ago, child advocates successfully lobbied 
for the creation of the nation’s first juvenile courts.26 Troubled that 
children tried and jailed with adults were denied the opportunity for 
 
24 387 U.S. at 13, 41–42, 56. 
25 JOHN R. SUTTON, STUBBORN CHILDREN: CONTROLLING DELINQUENCY IN THE 
UNITED STATES, 1640–1981, at 160–61 (1988) (“The reformers’ aim was to protect 
children from the law, not to bring more law to bear on them. They had little 
inclination to specify what the court should look like as a legal institution. Thus they 
emphasized the personal and professional qualities of court personnel and largely 
ignored the formal properties of court decision making.”). 
26 In 1899, Illinois passed the first Juvenile Court Act. 1899 Ill. Laws 131 (current 
version at 705 ILL. COMP. STAT. 405/1-2 (West 2009)). Within twenty years, all but 
three states had passed similar legislation. ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS: 
AMERICA’S JUVENILE COURT EXPERIMENT 81 (1978). Today, every state has a juvenile 
court. David B. Mitchell & Sara E. Kropf, Youth Violence: Response of the Judiciary, in 
SECURING OUR CHILDREN’S FUTURE: NEW APPROACHES TO JUVENILE JUSTICE AND YOUTH 
VIOLENCE 118, 122 (Gary S. Katzmann ed., 2002). See generally TASK FORCE ON JUVENILE 
DELINQUENCY, PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK 
FORCE REPORT: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH CRIME 2–4 (1967), reprinted in ELLEN 
MARRUS & IRENE MERKER ROSENBERG, CHILDREN AND JUVENILE JUSTICE 3–6 (2007).  
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rehabilitation, exposed to criminal role models, and abused by convicted 
adults with whom they were housed, these advocates envisioned a 
separate, and different, system for juveniles.27 
Rather than being adversarial and governed by rules of criminal 
procedure, juvenile court proceedings would be informal and flexible, 
with all parties focused primarily on the child’s rehabilitation.28 The 
vocabulary of the juvenile court reflected the desire to create a system 
distinct from the criminal one. Instead of “complaints” or “indictments,” 
charging documents were petitions “in the welfare of the child.”29 Rather 
than being found “guilty,” youths would be found “delinquent.”30 Instead 
of “sentences,” youths received “dispositions.”31 The juvenile court was to 
act as would a “kind and just parent.”32 Conspicuous by their omission 
were defense lawyers for juveniles who, according to many in the juvenile 
court movement, would only make the proceedings unnecessarily narrow 
and contentious.33 
The state assumed it had parens patriae power to proceed solely 
according to its view of the child’s best interest.34 Rudimentary due 
process concerns—such as whether reliable evidence existed to prove 
that a child had committed an alleged crime,35 whether the child had 
 
27 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 14–18 (summarizing scholarly literature describing 
juvenile court’s origins); see also DAVID S. TANENHAUS, JUVENILE JUSTICE IN THE MAKING 
3–22 (2004) (describing efforts of reformers and philanthropists during latter part of 
the nineteenth century to set up separate justice system in Chicago for children 
accused of committing crimes). Some commentators dispute an account of the 
juvenile court’s founders that ascribes to them only beneficent motivations. See, e.g., 
BARRY C. FELD, BAD KIDS: RACE AND THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE JUVENILE COURT 56 
(1999) (arguing that pro-juvenile court activists and legislators viewed the court as a 
social control mechanism for immigrant children flooding the nation’s urban centers 
at the turn of the century); Sanford J. Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: An Historical 
Perspective, 22 STAN. L. REV. 1187, 1194 (1970) (juvenile court created out of 
frustration of law-enforcement professionals that criminal courts routinely failed to 
obtain convictions of children owing to jury sympathy). 
28 FELD, supra note 27, at 68. 
29 Id. 
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 WILLIAM AYERS, A KIND AND JUST PARENT: THE CHILDREN OF JUVENILE COURT 24 
(1997). 
33 See generally id. at 26 (discussing Chicago reformer and juvenile court 
champion Jane Addams’ negative views about lawyers); Jacob L. Isaacs, The Role of the 
Lawyer in Representing Minors in the New Family Court, 12 BUFF. L. REV. 501, 503 (1963). 
34 Parens patriae is the state’s power, derived from chancery practice, to act in loco 
parentis to protect the property interests and person of the child. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 
1, 16 (1967). 
35 See In re Bentley, 16 N.W.2d 390, 393–94 (Wis. 1944) (holding that a petition 
alleging the child was delinquent in the language of the statute, if signed by a 
probation officer “familiar with the facts,” did not have to include a brief statement of 
facts supporting this assertion); State ex rel. Raddue v. Superior Court, 180 P. 875, 876 
(Wash. 1919) (holding that a petition alleging that a child “associates with a group of 
disorderly boys and engages in conduct which endangers his moral welfare” was 
Do Not Delete 4/7/2010  5:44 PM 
2010] LOSING HOLD OF THE GUIDING HAND 779 
notice of the charges and an opportunity to contest them,36 and whether 
the child was compelled to incriminate himself37—were subordinated to 
this power.38 The doctrinal justification for the state’s ability to do as it 
pleased with the juvenile was that the juvenile had no liberty interest that 
the state was bound to respect.39 Instead, the juvenile had only a right to 
custody, which could be provided by a parent or by the state without legal 
consequence.40 Thus, children’s rights as we understand them today were 
not ignored or violated by pre-Gault juvenile court personnel; they were 
simply not recognized.  
Beginning in the late 1950s, support for the juvenile court began to 
wane. Empirical evaluations revealed that children “treated” in the 
juvenile court did not appear to be deterred from future offending.41 
Civil rights activists objected to the uneven application of juvenile court 
laws based on race and income.42 In a series of cases issued beginning in 
1945, the Supreme Court emphasized the importance of procedure in 
criminal justice and administrative proceedings.43 Scholars began to 
document and critique abuses that resulted from juvenile court judges’ 
unbridled discretion.44 Several influential government reports issued in 
 
sufficient for a claim of disorderly conduct at a school, citing privacy concerns of the 
child as a reason to leave out more specific facts). 
36 See In re Bentley, 16 N.W.2d at 395 (holding that the court was not limited to the 
charge in the original petition but was permitted to make additional determinations 
in the best interest of the child). 
37 See In re Santillanes, 138 P.2d 503, 508 (N.M. 1943) (classifying juvenile 
proceedings as “special statutory proceedings” rather than criminal proceedings as 
justification for the lack of protection against self-incrimination); People v. Lewis, 183 
N.E. 353, 354–55 (N.Y. 1932) (holding that a juvenile delinquency hearing is not a 
criminal case, and therefore procedural safeguards against compelled self-
incrimination are neither necessary nor a right guaranteed by the constitution or 
state law). 
38 Julian W. Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HARV. L. REV. 104, 107 (1909) (“Why is it 
not the duty of the state, instead of asking merely whether a boy or a girl has 
committed a specific offense, to find out what he is, physically, mentally, morally, and 
then if he learns that he is treading the path that leads to criminality, to take him in 
charge, not so much to punish as to reform, not to degrade but to uplift, not to crush 
but to develop, not to make him a criminal but a worthy citizen[?]”). 
39 Sara Sun Beale, You’ve Come a Long Way, Baby: Two Waves of Juvenile Justice 
Reforms as Seen from Jena, Louisiana, 44 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 511, 516 n.31 (2009) 
(citing In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967)).  
40 See id. 
41 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 21–22; FELD, supra note 27, at 80. 
42 FELD, supra note 27, at 80. 
43 See, e.g., In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 20–21 (“The history of American freedom is, in 
no small measure, the history of procedure.” (quoting Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 
401, 414 (1945))); Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 555 (1966) (holding that due 
process hearing must precede transfer of juvenile to adult court and noting that 
“admonition to function in a ‘parental’ relationship is not an invitation to procedural 
arbitrariness”); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339–40 (1963). 
44 Chester James Antieau, Constitutional Rights in Juvenile Courts, 46 CORNELL L.Q. 
387 (1961) (expressing concern that traditional constitutional rights are denied to a 
large number of children in juvenile court proceedings without persuasive reasons as 
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the 1960s called into question whether the benevolence and paternalism 
of juvenile court were more theoretical than real.45 Against this backdrop 
of skepticism, state legislatures around the country amended their 
juvenile codes to add elements of due process to delinquency 
proceedings.46 
B. Announcing an End to a Kangaroo Court 
In 1967, amidst widespread condemnation of the juvenile court’s 
procedural arbitrariness and abuses, the Supreme Court in Gault held 
that children and youth in delinquency proceedings possess 
constitutional rights.47 The facts of the case presented an egregious 
example of the troubling verdicts and the harsh and disproportionate 
dispositions common in juvenile court, as well as the casual handling of 
evidence and procedure that facilitated such outcomes. As a result of 
making a single obscene telephone call, fifteen-year-old Gerald Gault was 
taken from his home by a probation officer, who failed to tell his parents 
where he had been taken or why.48 Gerald was brought before a juvenile 
court judge without first receiving notice of the charges against him, 
adjudicated delinquent, and sentenced without any attorney or 
adversarial, fact-finding hearing.49 The probation officer was permitted to 
offer hearsay evidence from the complaining witness. There were no 
other witnesses and no other evidence. The judge remanded Gerald to a 
state industrial school—the juvenile system’s prison equivalent—for a 
term of up to six years. The penalty that would have applied to an adult 
charged with the same offense was a fine of up to fifty dollars, or 
imprisonment for not more than two months.50 
Asserting that “the condition of being a boy does not justify a 
kangaroo court,” Gault held that constitutional protections were 
 
to the necessity of such a denial); Sheldon Glueck, Some “Unfinished Business” in the 
Management of Juvenile Delinquency, 15 SYRACUSE L. REV. 628 (1964) (exploring 
problems of absence of procedural protections in juvenile court); Monrad G. 
Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MINN. L. REV. 547, 550 (1957) (stating that 
humanitarian goals of original juvenile court are no justification for denying young 
people constitutional rights, notwithstanding absence of “criminal” label).  
45 See, e.g., NATIONAL CRIME COMMISSION REPORT, H.R. DOC. NO. 90-53 (1967), 
available at http://bulk.resource.org/gao.gov/90-618/0000551A.pdf; PRESIDENT’S 
COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A 
FREE SOCIETY (1967) [hereinafter PRESIDENT’S COMM’N], available at http://www.ncjrs. 
gov/pdffiles1/nij/42.pdf. 
46 As of 1967, at least one-third of the states provided, via either statute or court 
rule, the right of representation by retained counsel in juvenile delinquency 
proceedings, notice of the right, assignment of counsel, or a combination of these. In 
re Gault, 387 U.S. at 37 n.63. 
47 Id. at 13 (“[W]hatever may be their precise impact, neither the Fourteenth 
Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults alone.”). 
48 Id. at 4–5. 
49 Id. at 7–8. 
50 Id. at 8–9.  
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necessary to prevent the arbitrariness that had resulted in the six-year 
sentence for Gerald.51 Specifically, juveniles would henceforth be entitled 
to written and timely notice of the charges against them, the right to 
confront and cross-examine witnesses against them, the privilege against 
self-incrimination, and the right to counsel at an adjudicatory hearing 
that could result in confinement.52 In its holding, the majority rejected 
the notion that the juvenile court’s rehabilitative aspirations depended 
on denying children constitutional protections.53 It held that none of the 
unique and benevolent features of the juvenile court (emphasis on 
rehabilitation, flexibility, and confidentiality) would be impaired by the 
extension of due process to juveniles. The Court instead viewed due 
process guarantees as consistent with, and important for the achievement 
of, the goal of rehabilitation. In support, it cited a sociological study that 
had concluded: “Unless appropriate due process of law is followed, even 
the juvenile who has violated the law may not feel that he is being fairly 
treated and may therefore resist the rehabilitative efforts of court 
personnel.”54 The holding that a child in a delinquency proceeding has a 
liberty interest that demands protection, not merely a custody interest, 
constituted a significant doctrinal shift.55 So too did the statement that 
that liberty interest could not reliably be protected by a probation officer 
or judge.56  
The majority emphasized the necessity of counsel to ensuring the 
realization of due process for youths in juvenile court.57 Without counsel, 
the Court noted, a juvenile could not be expected to perform the 
necessary fact investigation, legal research, evidentiary objections, or 
 
51 Id. at 28. 
52 Id. at 33–55. 
53 Id. at 25–31. 
54 Id. at 26 (quoting STANTON WHEELER & LEONARD S. COTTREL, JUVENILE 
DELINQUENCY: ITS PREVENTION AND CONTROL 33 (1966)).  
55 See id. at 17. Seventeen years later, a different Court appeared to reconsider 
the robustness of the liberty interest it was willing to grant to juveniles. Upholding a 
vague preventive detention scheme for juveniles, the majority in Schall v. Martin 
declared that while a “juvenile’s . . . interest in freedom from institutional 
restraints . . . is undoubtedly substantial . . . that interest must be qualified by the 
recognition that juveniles, unlike adults, are always in some form of custody.” 467 
U.S. 253, 265 (1984). The dissent found the characterization of preventive detention 
as nothing more than a transfer of custody from a parent or guardian to the State 
“difficult to take seriously.” Id. at 289 (Marshall, J., dissenting).  
56 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 35–36 (“Probation officers . . . are also arresting officers. 
They initiate proceedings and file petitions . . . and they testify, as here, against the 
child. . . . The probation officer cannot act as counsel for the child. His role in the 
adjudicatory hearing, by statute and in fact, is as arresting officer and witness against 
the child. Nor can the judge represent the child.”). 
57 Id. at 41. The majority quoted approvingly from the Report of the President’s 
Commission on Law Enforcement and the Administration of Justice: “[N]o . . . action 
holds more potential for achieving procedural justice for the child in the juvenile 
court than provision of counsel.” Id. at 38 n.65 (quoting PRESIDENT’S COMM’N, supra 
note 45, at 86). 
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presentation of a defense.58 Such tasks were essential because 
delinquency proceedings that could end in a juvenile’s confinement in a 
state facility were, the Court ruled, comparable in seriousness to a felony 
prosecution.59 Accordingly, the Court cited as precedent those cases that 
had extended the right to counsel to adults.60 Furthermore, the Court 
stated that the assistance of counsel was to be effective assistance of 
counsel.61 
C. Gault’s Limitations 
While the extension of a right to counsel to youths in delinquency 
proceedings was doctrinally dramatic, the right granted was actually less 
powerful than it could have been. The narrow scope of the right to 
counsel, the Court’s treatment of a child’s right to waive counsel, and the 
ambiguity in the Court’s explanation of a parent’s role in delinquency 
proceedings have all contributed to a diminution of the power of the 
grant of a counsel right. Additionally, in failing to consider how 
immaturity and cognitive underdevelopment would affect youths’ ability 
to exercise their newly granted due-process rights, the Court missed a 
crucial opportunity to define the parameters of effective assistance of 
counsel. Further, by declining to address whether juveniles have a right 
to a transcript of the proceedings or a right to appeal, Gault also failed to 
ensure that children aggrieved by IAC would have an appellate remedy.62 
 
58 Id. at 36–40. 
59 Id. at 36, 49. “[C]ommitment is a deprivation of liberty. It is incarceration 
against one’s will, whether it is called ‘criminal’ or ‘civil.’” Id. at 50. The majority also 
noted that many juvenile courts typically disregarded even those due process 
protections that would typically be available even in civil proceedings, such as notice. 
Id. at 17 n.22. 
60 Id. at 36 n.57 (citing Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 61 (1932) (extending 
right to counsel to capital defendants in state trial under Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (extending 
right to counsel to adult defendants under the Sixth Amendment and incorporating 
the Sixth Amendment against the states)). 
61 The majority’s discussion of effective assistance was contained in its reference 
to Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541 (1966), concluding “In Kent . . . we stated 
that . . . . [w]ith respect to the waiver by the Juvenile Court to the adult court of 
jurisdiction over an offense committed by a youth . . . ‘there is no place in our system 
of law for reaching a result of such tremendous consequences without ceremony—
without hearing, without effective assistance of counsel, without a statement of 
reasons.’ We announced with respect to such waiver proceedings that while ‘We do 
not mean . . . to indicate that the hearing to be held must conform with all of the 
requirements of a criminal trial or even of the usual administrative hearing; but we 
do hold that the hearing must measure up to the essentials of due process and fair 
treatment.’ We reiterate this view, here in connection with a juvenile court 
adjudication of ‘delinquency’ . . . .” In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 30 (citations omitted) 
(quoting Kent, 383 U.S. at 554, 562). 
62 See In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 58. 
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1. Narrow Scope 
In spite of holding that “the child ‘requires the guiding hand of 
counsel at every step in the proceedings against him,’”63 the Court did 
not extend the right to counsel to all phases of a delinquency 
proceeding. The majority declined to address those phases of 
delinquency proceedings—detention hearing (analogous to a criminal 
bail hearing), arraignment, dispositional hearing (analogous to a 
criminal sentencing hearing), and post-dispositional hearing64—that were 
not at issue in the factual context of Gault.65 These omissions are 
significant. As commentators have argued, important rights are at stake 
in these phases of a delinquency proceeding. Without counsel who can 
argue for their release, for example, juveniles face unnecessary detention 
while waiting for trial, as well as prolonged and excessive periods of 
confinement following adjudication. 66 Additionally, without an attorney 
to represent them after they have been committed to a state facility, 
juveniles essentially have no ability to argue that they are being denied 
necessary or court-ordered services. Today, while some states provide 
counsel for juveniles in the other phases of delinquency proceedings, 
many do not.67 This has meant that many youths are subject to some of 
the same unfair treatment that characterized juvenile courts pre-Gault. 
 
63 Id. at 36 (citing Powell, 287 U.S. at 69). 
64 See HOWARD N. SNYDER & MELISSA SICKMUND, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, 
JUVENILE OFFENDERS AND VICTIMS: 2006 NATIONAL REPORT 104 (2006) (explaining the 
stages of a delinquency proceeding).  
65 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 13. “We do not in this opinion consider the impact of 
these constitutional provisions upon the totality of the relationship of the juvenile 
and the state. We do not even consider the entire process relating to juvenile 
‘delinquents.’ For example, we are not here concerned with the procedures or 
constitutional rights applicable to the pre-judicial stages of the juvenile process, nor 
do we direct our attention to the post-adjudicative or dispositional process. We 
consider only the problems presented to us by this case. These relate to the 
proceedings by which a determination is made as to whether a juvenile is a 
‘delinquent’ as a result of alleged misconduct on his part, with the consequence that 
he may be committed to a state institution.” Id. (citations omitted). 
66 See, e.g., Levick & Desai, supra note 20, at 175 (stating that the “failure of states 
to . . . provide counsel at certain critical stages of delinquency proceedings, leaves 
many youth vulnerable”); Sandra Simkins, Out of Sight, Out of Mind: How the Lack of 
Postdispositional Advocacy in Juvenile Court Increases the Risk of Recidivism and Institutional 
Abuse, 60 RUTGERS L. REV. 207, 210 (2007) (arguing that, because a child’s 
rehabilitation occurs, if it occurs at all, entirely through post-adjudication programs 
ordered by a court, legal advocacy is essential in the post-adjudication phase to 
ensure that these programs are provided and function as intended). Although the 
problems of substandard juvenile court legal representation are similar to the 
problems created by the absence of an attorney at all stages of a delinquency 
proceeding, it is beyond the scope of this Article to consider fully and separately the 
impact of not providing attorneys to juveniles at all stages. 
67 See Tory J. Caeti et al., Juvenile Right to Counsel: A National Comparison of State 
Legal Codes, 23 AM. J. CRIM. L. 611, 628 & n.115 (1996) (listing nineteen states that 
provide counsel at all stages of delinquency proceedings); Kristin Henning, Loyalty, 
Paternalism, and Rights: Client Counseling Theory and the Role of Child’s Counsel in 
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The scope of the right to counsel for adult criminal defendants is 
broader. The Supreme Court has held that adults charged with crimes 
with a potential penalty of incarceration must be appointed counsel at all 
stages of the prosecution in which substantial rights may be affected.68 
These so-called “critical” stages include pretrial lineups,69 arraignments,70 
probable cause hearings,71 and sentencing hearings.72 
Even though the majority held earlier in the opinion that 
delinquency proceedings that could result in significant deprivations of 
liberty are comparable to felony prosecutions,73 it justified the narrower 
scope of the juvenile right to counsel by stating that because a 
delinquency proceeding is different from a criminal prosecution, it need 
not conform to all the requirements of a criminal trial.74 The Court 
anchored the right to counsel not to the Sixth Amendment, reserved for 
criminal prosecutions, but to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.75 Other than the privilege against self-incrimination, which 
was based on the Fifth Amendment, all the rights extended to juveniles 
by Gault were grounded in the Due Process Clause.76 After Gault, the 
 
Delinquency Cases, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 245, 252 & n.31 (2005) (listing twenty-eight 
states that provide for counsel at dispositional stage). 
68 Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373 (1979) (citing Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 
U.S. 25 (1972)); Argersinger, 407 U.S. at 37. 
69 United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224 (1967) (“[O]ur cases have construed 
the Sixth Amendment guarantee to apply to ‘critical’ stages of the proceedings.”). 
70 Hamilton v. Alabama, 368 U.S. 52, 53 (1961). 
71 Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 8–9 (1970). 
72 Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128, 134 (1967). 
73 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 36 (1967).  
74 Id. at 30–31 (citing Kent v. United States, 383 U.S. 541, 562 (1966)). For an 
argument that a critical-stage analysis be applied to delinquency proceedings, see 
Levick & Desai, supra note 20, at 184–90. 
75 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 41 (“We conclude that the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment requires that in respect of proceedings to determine 
delinquency which may result in commitment to an institution in which the juvenile’s 
freedom is curtailed, the child and his parents must be notified of the child’s right to 
be represented by counsel retained by them, or if they are unable to afford counsel, 
that counsel will be appointed to represent the child.”). In his concurrence, Justice 
Black rejected the view that the rights in question should be afforded under the Due 
Process Clause. He argued that the proceeding at issue was the functional equivalent 
of a criminal trial. Under his view, the Fifth and Sixth Amendments should have 
applied; failure to extend to juveniles the specific right under these amendments 
violated equal protection guarantees. Id. at 60–61 (Black, J., concurring). See Irene 
Merker Rosenberg, The Constitutional Rights of Children Charged With Crime: Proposal for 
a Return to the Not So Distant Past, 27 UCLA L. REV. 656, 669 (1980) (explaining that 
because Justice Black found functional equivalence between delinquency 
proceedings and criminal trials, under his total incorporation view of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, all guarantees of the Bill of Rights at issue applied). 
76 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 30–31, 55. After Gault, the Court extended to juveniles 
in delinquency proceedings new constitutional rights, but only in two areas. See In re 
Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard 
governs juvenile prosecutions as well as criminal trials); Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519, 
531 (1975) (applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to delinquency proceedings). 
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relevant inquiry for courts considering whether to extend additional 
protections would be whether such protections are necessary to ensure 
that delinquency proceedings comport with the “fundamental fairness” 
mandates of the clause.77 
2. Inadequate Definition of Role and Purpose 
In addition to creating a juvenile right to counsel of narrower scope 
than that for adults, the Court also failed to adequately define the role 
and purpose of counsel for children, or to do so in a way that accounts 
for the unique characteristics of children. It said merely that children in 
delinquency proceedings need the assistance of counsel in order “to 
cope with problems of law, to make skilled inquiry into the facts, to insist 
upon regularity of the proceedings, and to ascertain whether [they have] 
a defense and to prepare and submit it.”78  
This definition is at best a bare-bones sketch of what a conscientious 
and zealous attorney in juvenile court must do; it ignores, for example, 
discussion of any counseling duties, such as whether to accept a plea 
offer or proceed to trial. Compounding this problematic definition is the 
Gault majority’s failure to address whether or how the incomplete 
cognitive development and social and emotional immaturity common to 
children and adolescents affect their ability to exercise the right to 
counsel.79 Children and adolescents tend to think concretely and have 
difficulty with abstract concepts, including the rights at issue in the 
delinquency process as well as the significance of exercising or waiving 
those rights, as numerous studies have shown.80 In many cases, they 
 
Otherwise, the Court has halted the extension of procedural protections afforded 
criminal defendants to juveniles, employing the flexibility of the due process standard 
to diminish juvenile rights. See Schall v. Martin, 467 U.S. 253, 281 (1984) (statute 
authorizing pretrial detention of juveniles without bail pending adjudication based 
on a judicial finding of future dangerousness did not run afoul of fundamental 
fairness guarantees); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528, 540–45 (1971) (plurality 
opinion) (juveniles not entitled to jury trials under either the Sixth Amendment or 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment). 
77 While the majority never actually used the phrase, justices who issued separate 
opinions described the majority’s reasoning as having been based on the 
“fundamental fairness” provisions of the Due Process Clause. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 
61–62 (Black, J., concurring); Id. at 72 (Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part). In subsequent cases, the Court characterized Gault this way. See, e.g., Martin, 
467 U.S. at 263; Jones, 421 U.S. at 531; McKeiver, 403 U.S. at 543. 
78 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 36. 
79 See Bishop & Farber, supra note 21, at 135–36; Emily Buss, The Missed 
Opportunity in Gault, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 39, 39 (2003) (arguing that Gault, “in 
assuming that children’s due process rights would, at best, match those of adults,” 
pretermitted thoughtful consideration of a range of changes that would be required 
to make the system fair to juveniles). 
80 See Laurence Steinberg & Robert G. Schwartz, Developmental Psychology Goes to 
Court, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 9, 25 
(Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000); Tamar R. Birckhead, The Age of the 
Child: Interrogating Juveniles After Roper v. Simmons, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 385, 418 & 
n.127 (2008) (summarizing studies on difficulties juveniles face understanding their 
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understand rights not as legal entitlements that they may choose to assert 
or to waive, but as opportunities to be given and taken away at the whim 
of the adults in their lives.81 Because they lack a well-developed fund of 
life experiences, juveniles can make imprudent and hasty decisions.82 
They also tend to have more difficulty than adults in weighing options, 
considering long-term consequences, and making choices.83  
Throughout Gault, the Court demonstrated concern for the 
particular vulnerabilities of young people and their need for protection 
against the overwhelming power of the state.84 Yet the Court did not 
address these same issues with respect to either how they would affect a 
child’s relationship with her lawyer or whether a child’s lawyer had any 
special ethical responsibilities as a result. The Court failed to clarify 
whether an attorney for a child was obliged to take special care to ensure 
a child’s comprehension of the complex rights at stake, as well as the 
court process. Furthermore, the Court did not articulate whether the 
attorney should allow the child client—who is recognized by the Court to 
be, in many contexts, immature and unable to make responsible 
decisions—to direct the course of her representation. This omission has 
resulted in a flurry of conflicting scholarly commentary and 
disagreement among courts about whether an attorney should practice 
 
Miranda rights as well as studies pertaining to juvenile competence to stand trial). But 
see Robert Epstein & Jennifer Ong, Are the Brains of Reckless Teens More Mature than 
Those of Their Prudent Peers?, SCI. AM., Aug. 25, 2009, available at http://www.scientific 
american.com/article.cfm?id=are-teens-who-behave-reck (summarizing a study that 
purports to show no difference between the brains of risk-taking teens and those of 
adults). 
81 See Emily Buss, The Role of Lawyers in Promoting Juveniles’ Competence as 
Defendants, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE JUSTICE 
243, 244–45 (Thomas Grisso & Robert G. Schwartz eds., 2000) (summarizing studies).  
82 See, Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 569 (2005) (“[A] lack of maturity and an 
underdeveloped sense of responsibility are found in youth more often than in adults 
and are more understandable among the young. These qualities often result in 
impetuous and ill-considered actions and decisions.” (quoting Johnson v. Texas, 509 
U.S. 350, 367 (1993))). See also Steinberg & Schwartz, supra note 80, at 26.  
83 Alan E. Kazdin, Adolescent Development, Mental Disorders, and Decision Making of 
Delinquent Youths, in YOUTH ON TRIAL: A DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE ON JUVENILE 
JUSTICE, supra note 80, at 33. But see Terry A. Maroney, The False Promise of Adolescent 
Brain Science in Juvenile Justice, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 89 (2009) (cautioning against 
overreliance on generalizations about youth based on neuroscience). 
84 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14–17 (1967) (discussing the historical treatment and 
view of children in juvenile court); Id. at 26 (citing studies which show that the lax 
attitude of paternalistic courts followed by strict discipline is harmful to the child 
“who feels that he has been deceived or enticed”); Id. at 45 (Justice Douglas’s 
characterization of a young boy as an “easy victim of the law,” who “cannot be judged 
by the more exacting standards of maturity,” during “the period of great instability 
which the crisis of adolescence produces” (quoting Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 
(1948))); Id. at 48 (confessions obtained from children are especially suspect); Id. at 
51–52 (children may be induced to give false confessions by “‘paternal’ urgings” of 
officials they feel they can trust); Id. at 52–53 (examples of children who felt 
pressured to give false confessions). 
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according to a child’s expressed interests or according to the attorney’s 
view about the child’s best interest.85  
The contemporary professional and academic consensus is that the 
“expressed interest” standard most closely adheres to Gault’s emphasis on 
the distinctness of a child’s liberty interest.86 As Professor Martin 
Guggenheim has explained, if a child is not given the power to direct his 
own counsel, the other due process rights granted by Gault would be 
“rendered illusory,” as an attorney could usurp those rights if he believed 
that doing so was in the child’s best interest.87 The absence of 
authoritative guidance from the Supreme Court has meant that some 
courts have ruled that an attorney is not ineffective when he practices 
according to his own view of the client’s best interest—even when it 
conflicts with the client’s expressed interest.88 
3. Problematic Treatment of Waiver of Counsel by a Juvenile 
The Court’s discussion of whether and under what circumstances a 
juvenile may waive his right to counsel is problematic. The Court’s 
emphasis on the centrality of counsel in ensuring due process would 
seem to indicate that it would have critically examined the concept of 
waiver in the delinquency context. The Court, however, did not do so 
and indicated that the juvenile could waive the right to counsel, and that 
the validity of the waiver would be evaluated under a totality-of-
circumstances test imported from adult court.89 It failed to specifically 
examine whether and, if so, how age, cognitive limitation, or immaturity 
could render a child’s waiver of counsel invalid; it also did not suggest 
any special safeguards for ensuring a child’s waiver was voluntary, such as 
 
85 Henning, supra note 67, at 253 (discussing commentary and conflict). 
86 Martin Guggenheim, The Right To Be Represented but Not Heard: Reflections on 
Legal Representation For Children, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 76, 86 (1984); see also Henning, 
supra note 67, at 255 (summarizing articles, professional standards, and model rules 
supporting the expressed-interest model for delinquency proceedings). 
87 Guggenheim, supra note 86, at 86. 
88 See, e.g., In re B.K., 833 N.E.2d 945, 948 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (holding no per se 
conflict of interest for counsel to act as both defense counsel and guardian ad litem 
in guilty plea cases); In re R.D., 499 N.E.2d 478, 481 (Ill. App. Ct. 1986) (same); In re 
K.M.B., 462 N.E.2d 1271, 1272–73 (Ill. App. Ct. 1984) (rejecting a juvenile’s claim 
that her lawyer’s “best-interest lawyering” deprived her of effective assistance of 
counsel when her lawyer made a dispositional recommendation contrary to her 
wishes). For an argument that the underpinnings of these holdings have been eroded 
by changes in the juvenile court as well as an evolution in scholarly and professional 
ethical norms, see Brief of Juvenile Law Center et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondent-Appellant at 34–38, In re Austin M., No. 4-08-0435 (Ill. App. Ct. Nov. 19, 
2009) [hereinafter Brief of Juvenile Law Center]. 
89 Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464–65 (1938) (stating that a determination of 
whether there has been an intelligent waiver of right to counsel depends on the 
particular facts and circumstances surrounding that case and should be made on the 
record). 
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requiring that a child speak with an attorney before waiving his right to 
be represented by one.90  
Furthermore, if a child has interests distinct from those of a 
probation officer or a judge, as the majority indicated,91 then it would 
seem that the Court would not have countenanced a child’s waiver at the 
inducement or invitation of one or the other, without the child first 
being required to speak with an attorney. Yet that is exactly what Gault 
allowed. In jurisdictions around the country, many children in 
delinquency proceedings appear without counsel.92 What is more, 
delinquency judges frequently permit children to waive counsel without 
following procedures created by the courts to ensure that waivers are 
knowingly and intelligently made.93 
The perils of allowing children to waive counsel were revealed in the 
scandal surrounding two juvenile court judges in northeastern 
Pennsylvania charged with taking bribes from juvenile detention center 
officials in exchange for sentencing juveniles to their facilities. Half of 
the children sentenced by one of the judges had waived counsel.94 
4. The Ambiguous Role of Parents 
Yet another issue that has proved confusing for juvenile court 
practitioners is the question of the rights and role of parents. The Gault 
majority extended to both child and parent the right to counsel. If they 
could not afford to pay for an attorney, delinquency courts would 
henceforth appoint counsel.95 The majority noted the Arizona court’s 
ruling that both a parent and a probation officer could be relied upon to 
protect a child’s interest in a delinquency proceeding.96 The majority 
 
90 In 1996, twenty-seven states allow juveniles in delinquency proceedings to 
waive their right to counsel. Caeti et al., supra note 67, at 624. In other legal contexts, 
the Court has similarly failed to require that state officials take special steps to ensure 
juvenile waivers of rights are voluntary. See Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 
(1979) (holding that the totality-of-circumstances test used to evaluate whether an 
adult has waived her rights under Miranda is sufficient to evaluate the same issue for 
juveniles).  
91 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 35–36 (1967). 
92 A 1993 study showed that in many states, less than half of juveniles accused of 
delinquency offenses receive counsel; waiver was the most common reason why 
juveniles were unrepresented. Caeti et al. supra note 67, at 617–18. See Mary 
Berkheiser, The Fiction of Juvenile Right to Counsel: Waiver in the Juvenile Courts, 54 FLA. 
L. REV. 577 (2002) (offering a historical overview of waiver of counsel in juvenile 
court pre- and post-Gault). 
93 Berkheiser, supra note 92, at 611–16, apps. C, D (discussing a study finding 
that eighty of ninety-nine cases in which a juvenile’s waiver was challenged as invalid 
were overturned on appeal). 
94 Ian Urbina & Sean D. Hamill, Judges Plead Guilty in Scheme to Jail Youths for 
Profit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 2009, at A22. See also Juvenile Law Center, http://www.jlc. 
org/luzerne (detailing litigation surrounding federal prosecutions and civil suits 
involving these judges). 
95 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 41. The Court did not specify whether “they” referred to 
the parents alone, or the parents and the child. 
96 Id. at 35. 
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explicitly rejected that court’s holding regarding the probation officer, 
but was less clear regarding its views on the parent.97 The Court’s lack of 
regard for the Arizona court’s position on the probation officer, 
combined with the rights-protecting logic driving the opinion, suggests 
that the Court would have intended for the parent to play no role in the 
child’s representation. And yet, later in the opinion, the Court indicated 
that parents can play such a role and can, in fact, waive a child’s right to 
counsel.98 The majority indicated that Gerald Gault’s mother had not 
executed a valid waiver of Gerald’s right to counsel.99 Yet it appeared to 
approve the concept that his mother could have properly waived counsel 
on his behalf.100 
In taking this seemingly inconsistent position on waiver, the Court 
also failed to discuss or even acknowledge the numerous situations that 
might arise in which a parent would have an actual or perceived conflict 
with the child that would prevent the parent from acting in the child’s 
best or expressed interest.101 Compounding the confusion about a 
 
97 Id. at 35–36. The relevant portion of the opinion addressing the status of the 
parent reads: “The [Supreme Court of Arizona] argued that ‘The parent and the 
probation officer may be relied upon to protect the infant’s interests.’ . . . We do not 
agree. Probation officers . . . are also arresting officers. They initiate proceedings and 
file petitions which they verify, as here, alleging the delinquency of the child; and 
they testify, as here, against the child. . . . The probation officer cannot act as counsel 
for the child. His role in the adjudicatory hearing, by statute and in fact, is as 
arresting officer and witness against the child. Nor can the judge represent the child.” 
One could argue that the majority’s “we do not agree” declaration pertains to the 
inability of both the parent and the probation officer to protect the interests of the 
juvenile. Yet the majority elaborated only on the role that might be played by the 
probation officer, essentially ignoring the parent’s role in this regard.  
98 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 41–42. See discussion supra Part II.C.3 (on waiver of 
counsel). 
99 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 42. 
100 The Court explained, “At the habeas corpus proceeding, Mrs. Gault testified 
that she knew that she could have appeared with counsel at the juvenile hearing. This 
knowledge is not a waiver of the right to counsel which she and her juvenile son had, 
as we have defined it. They had a right expressly to be advised that they might retain 
counsel and to be confronted with the need for specific consideration of whether 
they did or did not choose to waive the right. If they were unable to afford to employ 
counsel, they were entitled in view of the seriousness of the charge and the potential 
commitment, to appointed counsel, unless they chose waiver.” Id. at 41–42. 
101 Henning, supra note 67, at 255 (noting areas of parent-child conflict such as 
where a parent is the party initiating the proceedings against a child or where, in the 
course of defending a child, defense counsel will need to introduce information that 
could lead to criminal or civil charges against the parent for neglect or contributing 
to the delinquency of a minor); Brief of Juvenile Law Center, supra note 88, at 20 
(noting attorney’s view that because he had been retained for the juvenile by the 
parents who wanted to know “the truth” about what had happened, it would have 
been inappropriate for the attorney to proceed solely according to the client’s 
expressed interest). In my own ten-year experience as a defender in the juvenile 
court, I have witnessed many parents who, out of frustration with their children’s 
behavior and a sense of having exhausted all options for addressing it, want their 
children to be adjudicated delinquent so that they can receive services available only 
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parent’s role was the Court’s reference to a “parent’s right to . . . custody” 
of his or her child and its implication that parents have due process 
interests in delinquency proceedings because that right is threatened by 
the commencement of the delinquency case.102  
The Supreme Court realistically could not have been expected to 
anticipate or address each of the above issues pertaining to a juvenile’s 
right to counsel in a single opinion.103 Yet the failure of the opinion to 
articulate anything other than a bare-bones sketch of a juvenile 
defender’s role—and the absence of any subsequent Supreme Court 
consideration of these issues—means that attorneys have no definitive 
guidance on many practical and ethical issues relevant to how they might 
endeavor to represent their clients well, or well enough for their 
performance to be considered constitutionally effective assistance of 
counsel.104  
5. Declining to Find a Right to Appeal 
In addition to failing to take steps to ensure that the child’s right to 
counsel would be the right to the effective assistance of counsel, Gault 
did nothing to ensure that children harmed by ineffective assistance of 
counsel would have an appellate remedy. Indeed, the majority declined 
to rule on whether a juvenile who is adjudicated delinquent has the right 
to appeal or to obtain a transcript of her trial court proceedings.105 As will 
be discussed further in Part III, Gault’s ambiguities and omissions with 
respect to the role, purpose, and duties of counsel contribute to the 
problem of substandard legal representation. And as will be discussed in 
Part IV, the failure of Gault to rule that a juvenile has a constitutional 
right to appeal a delinquency finding constitutes one of the systemic 
barriers against filing an IAC claim.  
 
through the juvenile court. Such parents have little or no incentive to seek to ensure 
that their child is well defended by a zealous and competent attorney. 
102 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 34. For a thorough exploration of this point, see 
Henning, supra note 67, at 253. The influential developmental psychologists Joseph 
Goldstein, Anna Freud, and Albert Solnit argued that the right to counsel extended 
by Gault was not a personal right belonging to the child but a collective right of the 
family, which would “prevent juvenile ‘justice’ from usurping parental functions.” 
JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD 128–29 (1979). 
103 See Rosenberg, supra note 75, at 671 n.69 (suggesting that the Gault majority 
decided only what it had to because of the “far-reaching implications of the holdings 
that the Court did render”). Multiple issues pertaining to the adjudicatory phase were 
similarly reserved. Left undecided were the questions of whether, and to what extent, 
the juvenile court may admit hearsay or other normally inadmissible evidence, what 
the correct burden of proof is, and whether a juvenile court judge must state the 
grounds for his findings when he sits as trier of fact. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 11, 58. 
With In re Winship, the Court clarified that the State must prove all allegations against 
a juvenile beyond a reasonable doubt. 397 U.S. 358, 367 (1970). 
104 The failure of the Supreme Court to clarify the practical and ethical issues 
discussed is at least in part attributable to the difficulties juveniles have in filing 
appeals of their cases through which the question of effective assistance could reach 
appellate courts. These difficulties are, of course, the central concern of this Article. 
105 In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 58. 
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III. GAULT ON THE GROUND 
The promise of Gault, that delinquency proceedings would no 
longer be “kangaroo courts,” is threatened by routine and widespread 
substandard representation by attorneys that has plagued the post-Gault 
juvenile court.106 The reality is that in today’s juvenile courts, assigning an 
attorney to a case does not guarantee that a child’s due process rights will 
be honored. Nor does attorney representation mean that the child will 
have a voice in the proceedings, an advocate who will try to win her case, 
or, if that is not possible, an advocate who will craft the best available 
disposition.107 This Part will explore the problem of substandard 
lawyering in juvenile court: what it looks like, why it matters, and why it 
occurs so frequently.  
A. The Nature and Pervasiveness of Substandard Legal Representation 
After Gault, state and national bar associations and judicial 
organizations promulgated practice standards and model rules that filled 
in some of the gaps in Gault’s right-to-counsel holding discussed in Part 
II. These guidelines established that a delinquency attorney should 
perform essentially the same duties as are expected of attorneys in adult 
criminal court. Additionally, attorneys for juveniles in delinquency 
proceedings would be expected to familiarize themselves with their 
clients’ educational status and family history. Some of the standards 
required attorneys to attend to issues presented by their clients’ youth 
and immaturity when those issues were relevant to competency, the 
state’s ability to prove a case, or the attorney-client relationship.108 They 
 
106 FELD, supra note 27, at 124–27, 131–35 (summarizing the performance of 
defense counsel post-Gault). 
107 For a discussion of the importance of dispositional advocacy to excellent 
lawyering in the juvenile court, see Barbara Fedders et al., The Defense Attorney’s 
Perspective on Youth Violence, in SECURING OUR CHILDREN’S FUTURE: NEW APPROACHES TO 
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND YOUTH VIOLENCE 84, 91–100 (Gary S. Katzmann ed., 2002).  
108 The Model Rules of Professional Conduct require that lawyers work to secure 
the client’s interests. They also state that lawyers should be counselors, advisors, and 
advocates who are competent, zealous, and free of conflicts of interest. Those 
qualities assume a “requisite knowledge and skill in a particular matter,” 
thoroughness and preparation, and “commitment and dedication to the interests of 
the client.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.1 cmt. 1 (2006); id. R. 1.3 cmt. 1. 
The Rules also call upon attorneys to maintain as “normal” a relationship as possible 
with their clients, even when they have diminished decision-making capacity. Id. R. 
1.14(a). 
 Standards drafted jointly by the Institute for Judicial Administration and the 
American Bar Association (IJA-ABA) outline the following specific tasks for attorneys 
representing juveniles: interviewing clients; investigating cases; keeping clients 
informed; advising the accused; engaging in plea discussions; giving opening 
statements; presenting evidence; examining witnesses; giving closing arguments; 
attending to post-trial motions; investigating sentencing options; and noting appeals 
when requested. IJA-ABA standards state that juvenile clients’ youth and immaturity 
create additional burdens and responsibilities for their lawyers, requiring lawyers for 
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also established that an attorney should practice according to the child’s 
expressed interest rather than the attorney’s idea of the child’s best 
interest.109 
As suggested by national and state assessments of juvenile defender 
systems, the reality is that in spite of the presence of some excellent 
public defenders, specialized juvenile defense organizations, private 
attorneys, and law students and professors working in juvenile courts 
around the country, these performance standards and ethical rules 
appear to be honored mostly in the breach.110 In courts across the 
country, many attorneys for juveniles do not interview witnesses or visit 
the crime scene.111 They do not file pre-trial motions.112 They do not 
 
children to familiarize themselves with their clients’ individual and family histories, 
their education, state of physical and mental well-being, and cognitive or 
developmental disabilities, which it recognizes as relevant to competency, the ability 
of the state to prove the offense, the ability of the juvenile to raise a defense, as well as 
to the quality of the attorney-client relationship and the child’s ability to understand 
and process information from the attorney. See generally, NAT’L ADVISORY COMM. FOR 
JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE STANDARDS FOR 
THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE 273–79 (1980), available at http://www.eric. 
ed.gov/ERICWebPortal/contentdelivery/servlet/ERICServlet?accno=ED201923. 
 In 2004, the National Juvenile Defender Center, and the National Legal Aid and 
Defender Association, in partnership with the American Council of Chief Defenders, 
promulgated principles for indigent defense systems, which include “public defender 
offices, contract, appointed, and conflict counsel, law school clinics, and non-profit 
legal providers.” NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., TEN CORE PRINCIPLES FOR PROVIDING 
QUALITY DELINQUENCY REPRESENTATION THROUGH PUBLIC DEFENSE DELIVERY 3 n.2 (2d 
ed. 2008), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/10_Core_Principles_2008.pdf. The 
principles urge indigent defense systems to provide quality, specialized, and 
independent representation to child clients “throughout the delinquency process.” 
Id. at 2. They also recognize that “representing children in delinquency proceedings 
is . . . equally as important as[] the representation of adults,” and the need to 
“promote a juvenile justice system that is fair, non-discriminatory and rehabilitative.” 
Id. at 2–3. 
109 See Henning, supra note 67, at 246 (summarizing the relevant standards).  
110 A non-exhaustive list includes the Youth Advocacy Project in Boston, MA; the 
Children’s Law Center in Lynn, MA; the Juvenile Law Center in Philadelphia, PA; 
JustChildren in Charlottesville, VA; the Children and Family Justice Center at 
Northwestern Law School; the New York University School of Law Juvenile Rights 
Clinic; the Georgetown Juvenile Justice Clinic; and the Barton Clinic at Emory Law 
School. See Laura Cohen, New Hope Found in Practice Standards, CRIM. JUST., Winter 
2009, at 49 (noting small number of excellent attorneys in juvenile court). 
111 See ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. & MID-ATL. JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., MARYLAND: 
AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN 
DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 31 (2003), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/ 
mdreport.pdf. 
112 See, e.g., ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. & JUVENILE LAW CTR., PENNSYLVANIA: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY 
PROCEEDINGS 5 (2003), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/pareport.pdf (noting 
that in Pennsylvania, only one percent of court-appointed counsel reported regularly 
filing pre-trial motions other than requests for discovery). 
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prepare for dispositional hearings.113 They are by-and-large ill prepared 
for the particular challenges presented by bench trials, which are the 
norm in juvenile court.114 For reasons including exposure to prejudicial 
extra-record evidence about a particular juvenile and political pressure 
not to appear soft on crime, judges who sit as finders of fact are typically 
more skeptical of defense arguments than are juries.115 Yet most articles 
and treatises on trial skills focus on jury trials, with little to no training 
provided on the special challenges presented by bench trials.116 
Along with failing to do what would be expected for adult clients, 
attorneys also routinely ignore demands that the special characteristics of 
youth and the realities of delinquency proceedings place on their 
representation. In many instances, for example, attorneys do not meet 
with their juvenile clients outside of court appearances. Often, they meet 
with them for the first time on the day of trial.117 While this would be a 
problematic practice for adult defendants, it is particularly problematic 
with juvenile clients. Children, who have little to no experience with 
adults—especially adults outside the family—who can be trusted to 
pursue their wishes and expressed interests, need to spend time with an 
attorney before they can trust him and even consider following his 
advice.118 A typical hearing features court officers yelling orders, judges 
issuing warnings, prosecutors threatening punishment, and probation 
officers laying down rules.119 Absent repeated and consistent 
demonstrations of concern and loyalty from a defender, the child will 
likely perceive him as yet one more of what Professor Emily Buss 
memorably describes as the “finger-wagging lecturers” that predominate 
in juvenile court.120 However well-intended the attorney’s instruction or 
advice, if a child’s experience does not indicate that the attorney is on 
her side, she has no reason to listen.121 
 
113 See, e.g., ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. & MID-ATL. JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., supra 
note 111, at 33. 
114 In McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, the Supreme Court held that the fundamental 
fairness guarantees of the Due Process Clause are not offended by denying juveniles 
the right to trial by jury. 403 U.S. 528, 545 (1971). Only twenty states provide for jury 
trials for juveniles as a matter of state statutory or constitutional law. Birckhead, supra 
note 3, at 1451.  
115 See Martin Guggenheim & Randy Hertz, Reflections on Judges, Juries and Justice: 
Ensuring the Fairness of Juvenile Delinquency Trials, 33 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 553, 571–75 
(1998). 
116 Id. at 586–87. 
117 See, e.g., NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., MISSISSIPPI: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS 
TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN YOUTH COURT PROCEEDINGS 32 
(2007), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/mississippi_assessment.pdf.  
118 Buss, supra note 81, at 256–62.  
119 Id. at 260. 
120 Id. 
121 Of course, developing a relationship in which a client will learn to trust an 
attorney requires significant expenditures of time. Given the reality of huge, 
unmanageable caseloads for many defenders, such expenditures of time may be 
impossible. However, this reality does not change the fact that effective assistance 
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Children also need complicated legal concepts explained in 
language they can understand. Yet many attorneys make no effort to slow 
down court hearings, which typically move at lightning-quick speed, or to 
ensure their clients’ understanding of the court’s process and its 
significance.122 Washington v. A.N.J., a recent Washington Supreme Court 
decision allowing a twelve-year-old juvenile’s motion to withdraw a plea to 
first-degree sexual molestation based on the court’s finding that the 
attorney had been ineffective, offers an egregious but not atypical 
example of the deficient representation described herein.123 In that case, 
the court found that the attorney met with his client for a total of 
approximately ninety minutes prior to the plea hearing, failed to 
investigate in a meaningful way, and misinformed the juvenile of the 
consequences of the plea—which included possible placement on a sex 
offender registry for the rest of his life and notification of his school.124  
Additionally, rather than respect their duty of loyalty and 
confidentiality to the child, attorneys may routinely violate client 
confidences and have important conversations in the presence of parents 
or other court personnel.125 They may not follow their clients’ expressed 
wishes and instead insert their own judgment about what is best—even 
when that runs counter to their clients’ expressed interests.126 For 
example, such attorneys may fail to adequately research and investigate a 
case, believing that an adjudication that will lead to probation, and 
services, is what the child needs most.127 Even if they do not substitute 
their judgment for that of their clients, attorneys may practice a passive 
 
requires time. The lack of a structure that provides for it simply indicates a lack of 
political will, likely based on the lack of popularity of expending taxpayer dollars to 
adequately fund juvenile defense. 
122 See, e.g., NAT’L JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., FLORIDA: AN ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO 
COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 36 (2006), 
available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/Florida%20Assessment.pdf. As Emily Buss has 
noted, the presence of a jury functions to slow down the court process; because 
judges need to be sure that lay people understand the legal proceedings, judges take 
more time to give instructions in jury trials. In juvenile court, where most 
proceedings are bench trials, there is no jury to provide an external pressure to slow 
down the proceedings. Buss, supra note 81, at 252. This makes it incumbent on 
attorneys to serve that role.  
123 No. 81236-5, 2010 WL 314512 (Wash. Jan. 28, 2010). 
124 Id. at *1. 
125 Id. at *8, *10, *14 (holding that failure of juvenile’s attorney to provide 
opportunity to juvenile to “consult with and confide in his attorney without his 
parents present” was factor to be considered in assessing whether plea “was knowing, 
voluntary, and intelligent” and ultimately, based on other deficiencies of the attorney, 
allowing juvenile to withdraw plea to first-degree sexual molestation). See also Ellen 
Marrus, Best Interests Equals Zealous Advocacy: A Not So Radical View of Holistic 
Representation for Children Accused of Crime, 62 MD. L. REV. 288, 344–45 (2003) 
(discussing the issue of confidentiality violations committed by juvenile defenders).  
126 See, e.g., TEXAS APPLESEED, SELLING JUSTICE SHORT: JUVENILE INDIGENT DEFENSE 
IN TEXAS 24 (2000), http://texasappleseed.net/pdf/projects_fairDefenseJ_sell 
short.pdf.  
127 Marrus, supra note 125, at 290–91. 
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version of expressed-interest lawyering in which they blindly follow their 
clients’ wishes and do not offer them their counsel or explore 
alternatives.128  
In sum, attorneys fail their clients in myriad ways, by neglecting to do 
those tasks that would be required of them in adult court and by 
neglecting the ways in which youthfulness affects a client’s participation 
in a case. The next Sections explore the impact of these failings. 
B. The Negative Effects of Poor Lawyering on Youth 
Substandard lawyering negatively affects a youth’s case at both the 
adjudicatory and dispositional phases. At the adjudicatory phase, 
attorneys who do not investigate, file motions, or do legal research are 
unable to contest the state’s evidence at trial, thus all but ensuring a 
delinquent adjudication.129 Attorneys who are poorly prepared for trial 
may be inappropriately eager to resolve a case by way of a guilty plea, 
even when more diligent work would have revealed a ground for 
suppression of key evidence or a meritorious defense. The rate at which 
cases are decided by means of guilty pleas is extraordinarily high in 
juvenile court. While no national figures of the rate at which delinquency 
cases are resolved by means of a guilty plea are available, state studies 
indicate that the rate is upward of ninety percent.130 The high number of 
guilty pleas is not entirely attributable to poor legal representation. Yet 
the “plea culture” that predominates in juvenile court can countenance 
 
128 Kristin Henning has criticized this version of expressed-interest lawyering as 
insufficiently attentive to the realities of what a child client needs from his attorney. 
“Because children reason with a relatively small fund of general information and an 
even smaller fund of legal information, children need lawyers to help them 
understand the full range of options available to them in litigation. In a delinquency 
case, for example, the child may be asked to decide whether he will litigate pre-trial 
evidentiary issues; plead guilty or assert his right to trial; assert his right to cross-
examine government witnesses; and testify on his own behalf. Children have limited 
experience in these contexts and need and want the assistance and advice of a 
knowledgeable adult and legal advisor.” Henning, supra note 67, at 314. 
129 See Emily Buss, supra note 81, at 245 (noting prevalence of “cases in which 
judges find against the accused on thin evidence presented in a procedurally 
inappropriate manner”). 
130 See Mlyniec, supra note 4, at 371, 394 (summarizing studies of four states that 
estimated that approximately ninety percent or more of delinquency cases were 
resolved by plea). This number parallels that in state and federal criminal courts, 
where ninety-one percent of defendants plead guilty. Stephanos Bibas, Judicial Fact-
Finding and Sentence Enhancements in a World of Guilty Pleas, 110 YALE L.J. 1097, 1150 & 
n.330 (2001) (analyzing Bureau of Justice Statistics data on federal and state 
prosecutions). A number of commentators have critiqued the high rate of guilty pleas 
in the adult criminal context. See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Implementing the Criminal 
Defendant’s Right to Trial: Alternatives to the Plea Bargaining System, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 931 
(1983); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1196–
99 (1991); Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is Plea Bargaining Inevitable? 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037 
(1984). 
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lackluster efforts by defense attorneys.131 Poor preparation and 
performance by attorneys then encourages clients to plead guilty out of a 
sense of hopelessness.132 
The performance of attorneys at the dispositional phase of a 
delinquency proceeding is frequently poor as well.133 States provide for 
dispositional hearings at which all sides can present witnesses, offer 
written memoranda, and make oral arguments designed to procure a 
particular disposition.134 Model rules and standards make clear an 
attorney’s obligations at the dispositional stage.135 For juveniles to obtain 
the programs and services available to adjudicated delinquents, they 
need an attorney to make the case that those services are essential to 
their rehabilitation.136 Yet lawyers often fail to obtain education or health 
records of their clients or to seek available public funds to hire 
independent forensic psychologists or social workers. They instead rely 
on probation departments for relevant biographical information on their 
clients, essentially abdicating their critical role in this process.137 As such, 
their ability to make informed and persuasive dispositional arguments is 
limited. 
In addition to leading to outcomes the youth experiences as adverse 
and unfair at both the adjudication and the dispositional phases, 
deficient representation can also negatively affect her prospects for 
rehabilitation in more subtle but still significant ways.  
Gault recognized that the rehabilitative aspiration of the juvenile 
court requires that it adhere to due process, citing a study that concluded 
“[u]nless appropriate due process of law is followed, even the juvenile 
who has violated the law may not feel that he is being fairly treated and 
may therefore resist the rehabilitative efforts of court personnel.”138 
 
131 F. Andrew Hessick III & Reshma M. Saujani, Note, Plea Bargaining and 
Convicting the Innocent: The Role of the Prosecutor, the Defense Counsel, and the Judge, 16 
BYU J. PUB. L. 189, 210 (2002) (describing pressure to move cases quickly to 
resolution). 
132 See generally Drizin & Luloff, supra note 11, at 292. 
133 See Marrus, supra note 125, at 291. 
134 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2501(a)–(b) (2007) (describing evidentiary 
requirements for dispositional hearing, and establishing that juvenile may present 
evidence and advise court concerning disposition believed to be in juvenile’s best 
interest). 
135 See IJA-ABA JOINT COMM’N ON JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, STANDARDS 
RELATING TO INTERIM STATUS: THE RELEASE, CONTROL, AND DETENTION OF ACCUSED 
JUVENILE OFFENDERS BETWEEN ARREST AND DISPOSITION § 8.2 (1980); see also IJA-ABA 
JOINT COMM’N ON JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS, STANDARDS RELATING TO COUNSEL FOR 
PRIVATE PARTIES § 9.2 (a)–(b) (1980) (proffering standards requiring attorneys to be 
familiar with all community services and treatment alternatives available to the court 
and to investigate the source of any evidence introduced at a disposition hearing).  
136 See Simkins, supra note 66, at 210.  
137 See Marrus, supra note 125, at 290–91. 
138 In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 26 (1967) (citing STANTON WHEELER & LEONARD S. 
COTTRELL, JR., JUVENILE DELINQUENCY—ITS PREVENTION AND CONTROL 33 (1966)). See 
Bernard P. Perlmutter, “Unchain the Children”: Gault, Therapeutic Jurisprudence, and 
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Subsequent social science research has demonstrated a causal connection 
between whether a youth was treated fairly in court and her likelihood of 
reoffending.139 An important component of a child’s perception of 
whether the process was fair is her attorney’s performance; if a child 
reasonably believes that her attorney did not adequately prepare her 
defense, present a dispositional plan, or elicit her views on the case, that 
child may well view the entire court process as illegitimate.140 
What is more, the cost to youths of representation by substandard 
lawyers is high. Dispositions in juvenile court are becoming longer and 
more punitive.141 Today, most states have multiple areas in which 
delinquency adjudications have collateral consequences that follow a 
child into adulthood.142 A delinquent adjudication can result in 
suspension or expulsion from school,143 which decreases a child’s 
employment options.144 It can imperil a child’s chances at obtaining 
citizenship, permanent residency, or asylum if she is an immigrant; keep 
a child on a sex offender registry for multiple years or even, in some 
instances, for life; prevent a child from enlisting in the military; keep her 
from being accepted by a college or university, or hinder her chances at 
obtaining financial aid; disqualify her family from obtaining public 
housing; and prevent a child from eventually obtaining employment in 
 
Shackling, 9 BARRY L. REV. 1, 39 (2007) (describing opinion’s focus on child’s feelings 
and perceptions of fairness in the process as key elements of the child’s amenability 
to rehabilitation and discussing how this insight augurs the approach of therapeutic 
jurisprudence scholarship).  
139 Birckhead, supra note 3, at 1479 & n.132 (citing studies).  
140 See Henning, supra note 67, at 285. “In fact, a model of advocacy that denies 
the child a meaningful voice in the attorney-client relationship, and thus in the 
juvenile justice system as a whole, may actually hinder the rehabilitative and public 
safety objectives of the court. The client who is excluded from the process will be less 
likely to disclose important information, less likely to follow through on necessary 
steps in the case and less likely to comply with orders issued by a judge who has never 
heard or considered the child’s views.” Id. (footnotes omitted). 
141 As part of the “tough on crime” movement of the 1980s and 1990s, legislatures 
across the country modified their juvenile codes’ enabling clauses to include punitive 
language, enacted determinate and mandatory-minimum sentencing statutes, and 
reduced confidentiality protections for a subset of juvenile offenders. By the end of 
2004, juvenile codes in every state allowed juvenile court records to be released to 
prosecutors, law enforcement, social services agencies, schools, and/or victims. Codes 
also permitted law enforcement agencies to fingerprint and photograph juveniles 
under certain circumstances and exposed a subset of juveniles to some form of 
criminal sanctions. Perry L. Moriearty, Combating the Color-Coded Confinement of Kids: 
An Equal Protection Remedy, 32 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 285, 297 (2008).  
142 See, e.g., Pinard, Difficulties, supra note 7, at 1114–15 (cataloguing collateral 
consequences for juveniles). 
143 See, e.g., TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. § 37.006(b)–(e) (Vernon 2006) (describing 
circumstances allowing or mandating placement in alternative education program for 
students engaging in felony conduct on or off campus). 
144 See john a. powell, Structural Racism: Building Upon the Insights of John Calmore, 
86 N.C. L. REV. 791, 796–97 (2008) (discussing the relationship between school 
exclusion and labor market chances). 
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law enforcement.145 Additionally, a delinquent adjudication enhances 
adult sentences in all fifty states in one form or another.146 Furthermore, 
approximately half of all states now specify by statute that a prior 
delinquent adjudication makes a child eligible for transfer to adult 
court.147 Less tangibly but no less significantly, at a time when they are 
exploring and establishing their identities, youths labeled “delinquent” 
may come to embrace the role—to their own detriment as well as the 
detriment of society.148 
C. Reasons for the Pervasiveness of Substandard Representation 
The routinely poor performance of defense lawyers in juvenile court 
appears to have many root causes. Some pertain to both adult defendants 
and juveniles; some are unique to juveniles.  
1. Structural Causes 
Like adult criminal defendants, most juveniles are poor and thus 
eligible for appointed counsel.149 A number of problems endemic to 
indigent defense contribute to inadequate representation in both 
juvenile and adult courts. High caseloads, inadequate funding, and 
insufficient training are common in both adult and juvenile courts and 
 
145 See Pinard, Difficulties, supra note 7, at 1114–15 (noting collateral 
consequences of juvenile adjudications in the areas of housing, employment, and 
education); 1 RANDY HERTZ ET AL., TRIAL MANUAL FOR DEFENSE ATTORNEYS IN JUVENILE 
COURT § 14.07, at 365–66 (1991) (discussing immigration consequences, use of 
delinquency adjudications as sentencing enhancements, and forfeiture). 
146 See A.M. v. Butler, 360 F.3d 787, 790 (7th Cir. 2004). See also People v. Nguyen, 
209 P.3d 946, 948, 957 (Cal. 2009) (finding that juvenile adjudications fall under the 
“prior conviction” exception, and later use of that adjudication to enhance adult 
sentencing was appropriate) (citing Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 
(2000)); State v. Weber, 149 P.3d 646, 649, 653 (Wash. 2006) (en banc) (same) 
(citing Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 490); Joseph B. Sanborn Jr., Second-Class Justice, First-Class 
Punishment: The Use of Juvenile Records in Sentencing Adults, 81 JUDICATURE 206, 209–10 
(1998). 
147 Robert E. Shepherd, Jr., Collateral Consequences of Juvenile Proceedings: Part I, 
CRIM. JUST., Summer 2000, at 59. 
148 After being accused of being a thief, Jean Genet became one; “[t]hus . . . I 
decisively repudiated a world that had repudiated me.” LeninImports.com, Jean 
Genet Biography, http://www.leninimports.com/jean_genet.html. For a discussion 
of the shame and humiliation associated with involvement in juvenile court, see Paul 
R. Kfoury, Confidentiality and the Juvenile Offender, 17 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. 
CONFINEMENT 55, 56 (1991).  
149 See generally NAT’L CRIMINAL JUSTICE COMM’N, THE REAL WAR ON CRIME 130 
(Steven R. Donziger ed., 1996) (study of American crime, noting correlation between 
it and poverty). While comparable studies are not available for juvenile court, studies 
of criminal courts indicate that up to ninety percent of criminal defendants are 
financially eligible for appointed counsel. See Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. 
Beeman, Indigent Defense Systems in the United States, 58 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 31 
(1995).  
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contribute to inadequate representation in both court systems.150 Some 
appear to apply with particular force in juvenile court. For example, 
attorneys for indigent juveniles and adults often have high caseloads.151 
The numbers are, however, particularly punishing for juvenile 
defenders.152 While lack of training characterizes all indigent defense 
programs, the problem is particularly acute in juvenile court. Juvenile 
courts are often the first stop for recent law graduates, who, after gaining 
experience, are typically rotated into criminal court to represent adults.153 
They are also often havens for defenders looking for less scrutiny from 
their professional peers or their superiors.154 
An additional set of factors that contributes to inadequate 
representation is unique to the juvenile court. These are issues and 
problems that arise at least in part because of the gaps and ambiguities in 
Gault. But they also reflect long-standing cultural assumptions about 
children that Gault, despite bestowing a new set of rights on children, did 
not effectively dislodge.  
2. Resistance to the Empowerment of Youth and the Persistence of Best-
Interest Representation 
The first such factor is the belief that the consequences of 
involvement in juvenile court for a youth are insufficiently serious to 
merit a defense attorney’s best and most sustained efforts. As noted in 
the state-wide assessment of juvenile delinquency representation in 
Georgia, lawyers may rationalize half-hearted preparation on behalf of 
juvenile clients based on the fact that these clients, unlike their adult 
ones, will not face prison time.155 A related factor is the resistance of 
attorneys to the notion that the values and views of their child clients are 
worthy of respect. The backdrop to this resistance is the society-wide 
belief, sanctioned in centuries of statutory and constitutional law 
 
150 See Erica J. Hashimoto, The Price of Misdemeanor Representation, 49 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 461, 465, 474 (2007) (discussing problems of lack of funding and high 
burnout rate for attorneys which result in defense attorneys with minimal training in 
adult criminal court). 
151 Steven N. Yermish, Ethical Issues in Indigent Defense: The Continuing Crisis of 
Excessive Caseloads, CHAMPION, June 2009, at 22 (describing problem of high caseloads 
for defenders of indigent adults and juveniles). 
152 Jerry R. Foxhoven, Effective Assistance of Counsel: Quality of Representation for 
Juveniles Is Still Illusory, 9 BARRY L. REV. 99, 119 (2007) (noting national studies of 
juvenile defense that document caseloads as high as 1,500 cases per year in Virginia). 
153 Birckhead, supra note 5, at 1498 (describing phenomenon in North Carolina 
of assigning new attorneys to juvenile court).  
154 See BARBARA FLICKER, PROVIDING COUNSEL FOR ACCUSED JUVENILES (1983). “In 
some defender offices, assignment to ‘kiddie court’ is the bottom rung of the ladder, 
to be passed as quickly as possible on the way up to more visible and prestigious 
criminal court assignments. Little attention may be paid by superiors to performance 
in juvenile court, providing few incentives for hard work.” Id. at 2. 
155 ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. & S. CTR. FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, AN ASSESSMENT OF 
ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY PROCEEDINGS 29 
(2001), available at http://www.njdc.info/pdf/georgia.pdf. 
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opinions, that children are too immature to be trusted to make choices 
that have long-term implications.156 Laws that deny children rights in the 
name of protecting them have been repeatedly upheld against 
constitutional attack.157 For many attorneys, the relatively recent academic 
and professional consensus in favor of client-directed representation runs 
strongly counter to their own experiences and belief systems. When these 
attorneys practice in one of the many courts around the country that 
foster and reward a go-along-to-get-along approach by defense lawyers, 
the pressure to abandon the child’s expressed interest may well be 
overwhelming.158  
In certain delinquency cases, a lawyer’s view of a child’s best interest 
might match the child’s actual and expressed interest such that the goals 
of the lawyer and client might be aligned. Yet even in these cases, if the 
lawyer allows his own views about the appropriate rights and status of 
children to interfere with his client’s exercise of their due process rights, 
as described in Part III.A, he has violated the spirit of Gault and likely 
contributed to a process, if not an outcome, that the client experiences as 
adverse.159  
3. The Trouble with Parents 
Another juvenile-specific factor underlying substandard legal 
representation, also traceable to the gaps and ambiguities in Gault, is the 
reality—and potentially troubling interference—of parents and 
guardians. This problem takes many forms. An attorney may experience 
conflict when his client expresses a desire to plead guilty but his client’s 
parents insist on a trial. In such instances, parents may unreasonably 
believe in their child’s innocence, either because their child has been less 
than truthful with them or because they refuse to acknowledge that she 
has broken the law.160 Conversely, an attorney may be ordered by parents 
to pressure the child to take a plea deal, even when the child is insisting 
she wants a trial, because the parents do not wish to continue to come to 
 
156 See Martin Guggenheim, Minor Rights: The Adolescent Abortion Cases, 30 HOFSTRA 
L. REV. 589, 638 (2002). 
157 See, e.g., Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 643 (1979) (upholding parental 
notification statutes regulating minors’ access to abortion lawful if minors can seek 
judicial bypass); Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629, 636–37 (1968) (upholding a law 
restricting the dissemination of non-obscene, sexually explicit material to individuals 
over the age of seventeen).  
158 See Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imagining Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order: 
The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1129–30 (1991); BARRY 
C. FELD, JUSTICE FOR CHILDREN: THE RIGHT TO COUNSEL AND THE JUVENILE COURTS 238 
(1993) (documenting instances where judges sentenced represented juveniles more 
harshly than those who were pro se). 
159 Marrus, supra note 125, at 290–91, 326–27 (criticizing best-interest lawyering 
as harmful to children); Marrus, supra note 9, at 417–19 (same). 
160 For a discussion of the tensions and need for collaboration among children, 
parents, and attorneys, see Kristin Henning, It Takes a Lawyer to Raise a Child? 
Allocating Responsibilities Among Parents, Children, and Lawyers in Delinquency Cases, 6 
NEV. L.J. 836, 837–67 (2006). 
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court, or want their child to “learn a lesson,” or for any other number of 
reasons. If an attorney adheres to his client’s wishes, parents can simply 
wait until they are alone with the child and then direct her to plead 
guilty, or to accept punitive consequences at home. Such tensions may be 
particularly acute when the parents have retained the attorney, who may 
experience conflict between the ethical demands of loyalty to a juvenile 
client and the reality that parents footing a hefty legal bill may expect to 
direct the legal representation.161  
As with best-interest representation, any inclination an attorney may 
have to accede to the wishes of a child’s parents instead of a child is 
linked to a society-wide belief system sanctioned in law. That is, any rights 
possessed by a child are thought to be subordinate to the prerogatives of 
parents to raise their children as they see fit.162 In Parham v. J.R., for 
example, the Supreme Court ruled that a child’s liberty interest in not 
being involuntarily confined in a state mental institution is “inextricably 
linked with the parents’ interest in and obligation for the welfare and 
health of the child.”163 It followed for the Court that a procedure 
authorizing the commitment of a child by her parent over the child’s 
objection and in the absence of any adversary pre-admission proceeding 
did not offend the Constitution. In its ruling, the Court noted the 
presumption in the law that “parents possess what a child lacks in 
maturity, experience, and capacity for judgment required for making 
life’s difficult decisions,” and that “natural bonds of affection lead 
parents to act in the best interests of their children.”164 It does not 
ineluctably follow in every case that an attorney experiencing role 
conflict because of the presence and involvement of parents will in fact 
resolve that conflict against the interests of her client. Nonetheless, 
parents’ pressure can make the already difficult work of delinquency 
representation even harder. 
 
161 Henning, supra note 67, at 302 (noting problem and noting clear ethical 
mandates in Model Rules against allowing paying parent to direct course of 
representation). 
162 See Guggenheim, supra note 156, at 592 (“[O]ne cannot discuss constitutional 
rights of children without recognizing that children must be discussed in relational 
terms.”).  
163 442 U.S. 584, 600 (1979). 
164 Id. at 602. In his concurrence, Justice Stewart explained that because of the 
commonality of interest between parents and children, children are in the position of 
patients who commit themselves voluntarily, and “voluntary” patients do not require 
legal rights or procedural protections. Id. at 622–23. As one commentator memorably 
described, “In one quick stroke, Justice Stewart transformed the parent into a 
ventriloquist, and the child into Charlie McCarthy; no matter how the voices sound, 
they all come from the same place.” Catherine J. Ross, From Vulnerability to Voice: 
Appointing Counsel for Children in Civil Litigation, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 1571, 1581 
(1996). The presumption of parental fitness is of course subject to the exception of 
parental abuse and neglect authorizing state intervention in the family unit. Santosky 
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 769–70 (1982) (holding that clear and convincing 
evidentiary standard applies to termination of parental rights proceedings). 
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The pressure to practice best-interest lawyering and to cede to wishes 
of parents—in other words, to ignore ethical norms and professional 
standards—may feel particularly intense because of the closed-door, 
rarefied atmosphere of juvenile court. Many states close their juvenile 
courtrooms to the public, pursuant to confidentiality statutes presumably 
enacted to shield juveniles from the stigma associated with 
delinquency.165 Yet closed doors effectively shield lawyers and judges from 
scrutiny they might otherwise face from the public and the press. With 
more scrutiny, attorneys might take their ethical duties more seriously, 
and judges might behave more professionally and appropriately.166 
IV. IN SEARCH OF AN EFFECTIVE APPELLATE REMEDY 
There is an appellate remedy—at least in theory—for children who 
are harmed by poor lawyering: file an appellate claim of ineffective 
assistance of counsel (IAC). This Part will provide the background, 
underpinnings, and procedural nuances of that remedy and suggest types 
of claims a juvenile might wish to file. It will present findings from a 
survey conducted by the author that reveals an extremely low number of 
IAC claims filed in delinquency cases over the last ten years. It will then 
examine how both legal doctrine and rules and policies governing IAC 
claims create nearly insurmountable hurdles for aggrieved juveniles. 
A. The Mechanics and Doctrine of a Juvenile IAC Claim 
Although Gault did not provide for a juvenile’s right to appeal from 
a delinquency adjudication and disposition, the right to direct appeal is 
now explicitly provided to children adjudicated delinquent in most states 
as a matter of state statutory or constitutional law.167 Additionally, 
 
165 See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 119, § 65 (West 2008) (excluding public 
from delinquency proceedings). 
166 For a discussion of the arguments for and against confidentiality in juvenile 
delinquency proceedings, see Kristin Henning, Eroding Confidentiality in Delinquency 
Proceedings: Should Schools and Public Housing Authorities be Notified?, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
520 (2004). Observers have attributed the scandal surrounding the Pennsylvania 
judges who took bribes for sentencing juveniles to detention facilities in part to the 
confidentiality provisions that apply to the state’s juvenile proceedings. Ian Urbina & 
Sean D. Hamill, Judges Plead Guilty in Scheme to Jail Youths for Profit, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 
2009, at A22. In his concurring and dissenting opinion in McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 
Justice Brennan noted that the value of fundamental fairness could be honored in a 
bench-trial delinquency system only where that system was open to public exposure, 
so that the “accused may in essence appeal to the community at large, by focusing 
public attention upon the facts of his trial, exposing improper judicial behavior to 
public view, and obtaining, if necessary, executive redress through the medium of 
public indignation.” 403 U.S. 528, 555 (1971) (Brennan, J., concurring). This insight 
applies equally to defense lawyers who behave improperly. 
167 Statutes which establish the right to appeal: ALA. CODE § 12-15-601 
(LexisNexis Supp. 2008); ALASKA STAT. § 47.12.120 (2008); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-
325 (2007); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-27-325(f) (2008); CAL WELF. & INST. CODE § 395 (West 
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appellate courts have assumed the authority to hear juvenile appeals 
based on arguments of IAC.168 Further, national standards have been 
promulgated stating that an appellate attorney has an ethical obligation 
to comb the record for ineffective assistance and to make an IAC claim 
where one is warranted.169 Thus, a structure is in place in which a child 
can bring an IAC claim.  
 
2008); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46b-142 (West 2009); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, § 1051 
(1999); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 985.01 (West 2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 15-11-3 (2008); HAW. 
REV. STAT. § 571-11 (2006); ILL. CT. R. & P. 604 (West 2009); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-32-
15-1 (LexisNexis 2007); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.133 (West 2006); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
610.130 (LexisNexis 2008); LA. CHILD. CODE ANN. art. 330 (2004); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 
tit.15, § 3402 (Supp. 2009); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 12-301 (LexisNexis 
2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS. ANN. ch. 119, § 56(g) (West 2008); MICH. CT. R. 3.993 
(2009); MINN. R. CT. 21.03 (2009); MO. ANN. STAT. § 211.261 (West 2004); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 41-5-1423 (2009); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-287.06 (2008); NEV. REV. STAT. § 
62D.500 (2007); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 169-B:29 (LexisNexis 2001); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 
2A:4A-40 (West 1987); N.M. R. ANN. 10-251 (2009)); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1112 
(McKinney 1999); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7B-2602 (2007); N.D. CENT. CODE § 27-20-56 
(2006); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2501.02 (West 2006); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10A, § 2-2-
601 (West 2009); OR. REV. STAT. § 419A.200 (2007); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 14-1-52 (2002); 
TENN. CODE ANN. § 37-1-159 (2005); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 56.01 (Vernon 2009) 
(appeal is limited); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 33, § 5113 (2009); VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-296 
(Supp. 2009); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 13.04.033 (West 2004); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 49-
5-13 (LexisNexis 2009); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-233 (2009). Constitutions which 
provide the right to appeal: PA. CONST. art. V, § 9; UTAH CONST. art. VIII, § 5. There is 
no reference in the state codes of Colorado, Idaho, Kansas, Mississippi, South 
Carolina or South Dakota to a juvenile’s right to appeal. But see Marc M. Arkin, 
Rethinking the Constitutional Right to a Criminal Appeal, 39 UCLA L. REV. 503 (1992) 
(some form of appellate review is provided by statute in every state); 1 HERTZ ET AL., 
supra note 145, at 913 (“If a State allows appeals of criminal convictions, a juvenile 
respondent who is not given a statutory right to appeal may be able to contend that 
this disparate treatment violates the equal protection of the laws.”).  
168 One notable outlier is Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals Judge Easterbrook, 
who suggested, in a dissenting opinion in a case in which a juvenile was granted relief 
pursuant to a habeas petition, that juveniles are not entitled to effective assistance 
because Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), and progeny are based on the 
Sixth Amendment (which does not govern the juvenile right to counsel). A.M. v. 
Butler, 360 F.3d 787, 806 (7th Cir. 2004) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting). Easterbrook 
surely puts the doctrinal cart before the horse here; as asserted infra Part V, the 
question that should concern appellate courts is the appropriate constitutional 
standard by which to assess juvenile claims of ineffective assistance of counsel, not 
whether juveniles are entitled to effective assistance in the first instance, a matter 
which In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967), settled.  
169 Lee Teitelbaum, Standards Relating to Counsel for Private Parties, in IJA-ABA 
JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS ANNOTATED: A BALANCED APPROACH 69 (Robert E. 
Shepherd, Jr. ed., 1996). Standard 10.7(a) provides that, “A lawyer appointed or 
retained to represent a client previously represented by other counsel has a good 
faith duty to examine prior counsel’s actions and strategy. If, after investigation, the 
new attorney is satisfied that prior counsel did not provide effective assistance, the 
client should be so advised and any appropriate relief for the client on that ground 
should be vigorously pursued.” Id. at 94. 
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Nearly all appellate courts evaluate such claims using the two-prong 
test articulated in Strickland v. Washington,170 or a state constitution-based 
analog.171 The Strickland test requires a showing by the juvenile that; (1) 
his attorney’s performance fell below objective standards of reasonable 
attorney performance; and (2) but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, 
there existed a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding 
would have been different.172 When both prongs of the test are satisfied, 
the representation is defective and the juvenile is entitled to a new 
adjudicatory or dispositional hearing, or to withdraw a plea.173  
B. Types of Claims that Are, or Could Be, Filed by Juveniles 
Reviewing courts have found trial counsel for juveniles ineffective for 
failing to file an appeal of an adjudication based on insufficient 
evidence;174 failing to move to suppress an involuntarily obtained 
confession without which, the juvenile indicated in a habeas corpus 
 
170 466 U.S. at 687. Strickland held that the test should govern the adjudicatory 
and sentencing phases of capital trials as well as the adjudicatory phase of non-capital, 
adult criminal cases. The facts of the case did not require a consideration of whether 
the test would apply to sentencing phases of non-capital trials or to delinquency cases, 
and the Court did not reach beyond the facts to decide that question. Id. The test was 
later applied to guilty pleas. Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 58 (1985). 
171 See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Bart B., 679 N.E.2d 531, 534 (1997) (stating that 
the determination of ineffective assistance of counsel is governed by Strickland); State 
v. Dawson, 768 So. 2d 647, 650 (La. Ct. App. 2000) (citing several state cases that 
analyzed ineffective assistance of counsel claims under two-prong Strickland test, 
finding that juvenile defendants did not meet either prong when their attorney 
stipulated to probable cause prior to transfer hearing). See also Marrus, supra note 9, 
at 393 n.4 (2003) (cataloguing cases in which Strickland standard utilized in juvenile 
appeals featuring IAC claims).  
 In Hawaii, the state Supreme Court has rejected the Strickland test in measuring 
ineffectiveness of counsel for adults and juveniles for all claims brought under both 
the Hawaii State Constitution and the U.S. Constitution. State v. Smith, 712 P.2d 496, 
500 n.7 (Haw. 1986). Finding the test’s prejudice requirement unduly burdensome 
for defendants, the state’s high court has ruled that individuals raising ineffective 
assistance of counsel claims need only show “specific errors or omissions . . . 
reflecting counsel’s lack of skill, judgment, or diligence,” and that “these errors or 
omissions resulted in either the withdrawal or substantial impairment of a potentially 
meritorious defense.” State v. Antone, 615 P.2d 101, 104 (Haw. 1980).  
172 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient 
to undermine confidence in the outcome. Id. at 694. 
173 See Hill, 474 U.S. at 58; Strickland, at 687. Additionally, where a state actor 
deprives a defendant of access to an attorney or interferes in the attorney-client 
relationship, or an attorney is burdened by conflicts of interest, a defendant is 
presumed to have been denied effective assistance of counsel without needing to 
meet the two-prong test. See United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 649–50 (1984); 
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 345, 348 (1980). 
174 See, e.g., In re Anthony J., 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 865, 867, 872 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) 
(insufficient evidence to sustain the adjudication in case of receiving stolen motor 
vehicle after finding juvenile’s counsel ineffective for failing to preserve right to 
appeal). 
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proceeding, he would not have made an admission;175 erroneously 
advising a juvenile about the possibility of a deferred disposition prior to 
adjudication;176 and sending subpoenas to key defense witnesses with the 
incorrect date of return.177 Juveniles have also had success raising claims 
of IAC based on substandard lawyering that resulted from a lawyer’s 
excessively high caseload.178 
In addition to claims based on the types of deficient trial counsel 
performance discussed above that are common to both juvenile and 
adult criminal court, juveniles also are harmed when their attorneys 
substitute their own views of what is best for their child clients’ expressed 
wishes. As argued above, best-interest lawyering can negatively affect both 
the outcome and the child’s experience of the process in a particular 
case. Specifically, where an attorney’s actions on behalf of a client are 
limited or constrained by his own view of what is best for the client, he is 
arguably unable to provide assistance of counsel that is “not diluted by 
conflicting interests or inconsistent obligations.”179 In these instances, he 
will have provided ineffective assistance. At least one court has 
acknowledged that best-interest lawyering in a delinquency case could 
constitute such a conflict of interest.180  
Juveniles are also harmed when their attorneys do not account for 
their cognitive deficits and immaturity in ways that affect the outcome. In 
theory, they should be able to bring IAC claims on this basis. Yet a search 
for IAC claims arising out of cases where an attorney prejudicially failed 
to attend to a child’s cognitive or maturity deficits uncovered only one 
such claim.181 While it is of course possible that such claims have been 
 
175 In re Matthew K., No. E031468, 2002 WL 31840658, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 
19, 2002) (finding ineffective assistance of counsel for failure to challenge coerced 
and inadmissible confession, reversing delinquency adjudication and remanding the 
case). See also In re S.E., No. 22458, 2008 WL 2404039, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. June 13, 
2008) (finding counsel ineffective for failing to renew at trial motion to suppress 
statement). 
176 State v. B.J.S., 169 P.3d 34, 39 (Wash. Ct. App. 2007) (reversing adjudication 
after finding attorney’s failure to advise juvenile that deferred disposition was possible 
undermined confidence in the outcome of a guilty plea). 
177 In re Parris W., 770 A.2d 202, 209–10 (Md. 2001) (finding juvenile’s lawyer 
ineffective for incorrectly listing the date of subpoenas for five corroborating 
witnesses after reviewing their potential statements and determining juvenile could 
have presented a sound alibi defense). 
178 In re Edward S., 92 Cal. Rptr. 3d 725, 741 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (counsel 
ineffective in sex offense case for failing to investigate potentially exculpatory 
material and failing to move for substitution of counsel knowing he was unable to 
devote required time to case). 
179 People v. Spreitzer, 525 N.E.2d 30, 34 (Ill. 1988). In instances where a 
defendant can demonstrate a conflict of interest, the Sixth Amendment right to 
effective assistance is implicated. See Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 348 (1980). 
180 State v. Joanna V., 94 P.3d 783, 786–87 (N.M. 2004) (counsel required to 
follow client’s express interest rather than attorney’s belief in best interest).  
181 In re Victoria D., 864 N.Y.S.2d 13, 14 (N.Y. App. Div. 2008) (denying juvenile’s 
claim that her attorney provided ineffective assistance at trial by failing to ensure that 
she understood that once the defense rested she was no longer able to testify). 
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filed and rejected in unpublished opinions that are not reported in 
Westlaw or Lexis, the near-total absence of such claims in opinions that 
do appear in these search engines suggests otherwise. 
C. Juvenile IAC Claims: Few and Far Between 
Juveniles file IAC claims on any grounds very infrequently. Between 
1995 and 2005, the last year for which comprehensive data are available, 
over six million youths were adjudicated delinquent.182 In that same time 
period, in all fifty states, only 290 adjudicated juveniles filed IAC claims 
that resulted in opinions published by Westlaw and/or LexisNexis.183 
Among those cases, only forty-one IAC claims yielded appellate relief.184 
While precise numbers documenting the national scope of IAC over that 
same ten-year period do not exist, the incidence of substandard 
representation—as measured in statewide and national assessments of 
the National Juvenile Defender Center—does not appear to be reflected 
in the low number of IAC claims brought on behalf of juveniles harmed 
by poor representation.185 While it is not possible to say definitively why so 
 
182 The total number of delinquency adjudications between 1995 and 2005 was, 
according to the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 6,314,800. See 
C. PUZZANCHERA & W. KANG, NAT’L CTR. FOR JUVENILE JUSTICE, JUVENILE COURT 
STATISTICS DATABOOK: CASE PROCESSING (2008), http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/ 
jcsdb/asp/process.asp. 
183 The methodology I employed to arrive at this number is as follows. I first 
searched the “All States” database in Westlaw for cases in which the words “juvenile” 
and “appeal” appeared in the case summary. I then searched those cases for “effective 
assistance” or “ineffective assistance,” while excluding the word “dependency,” which 
would have found abuse and neglect rather than delinquency cases. I then performed 
a similar search on LexisNexis using “juvenile” or “minor w/s delinqu!” and “appeal” 
and “ineffective w/2 assistance” and “HEADNOTES(juvenile).” I then excluded all 
claims on behalf of juveniles tried as adults, except for any hearings in the juvenile 
court pertaining to whether a transfer to adult court would occur, as the analysis in 
this Article does not necessarily apply to cases of juveniles tried in adult court, who 
are often represented by attorneys different from those who typically appear in 
juvenile court, operating under different circumstances. Establishing conclusive data 
regarding juvenile IAC claims proves difficult for a number of reasons, including 
variations among states in reporting unpublished legal opinions to Lexis Nexis and 
Westlaw, limitations in search engines including the unavailability of parameters 
restricting searches to juvenile court, and inconsistent terminology among court 
systems.  
184 Research on file with Author. I included in this number cases in which 
appellate courts specifically allowed the IAC claim(s); cases in which relief was 
provided only on other grounds are not included. See, e.g., In re Orr, No. 
1999AP040032, 2000 WL 502692, at *1 (Ohio Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2000) (reversing 
conviction of juvenile for grand theft of a motor vehicle on ground that trial court 
improperly conducted plea colloquy and ruling that claim of ineffective assistance of 
counsel was moot).  
185 A number of methodological problems make it impossible to state definitively 
that appellate attorneys inappropriately underutilize IAC claims relative to the rate of 
substandard legal representation. For one, as discussed supra note 183, many 
unpublished appellate opinions are not reported. Additionally, attorneys may initially 
file IAC claims in appeals which their clients ultimately decide to withdraw. Finally, 
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few IAC claims are brought when the preceding discussion would seem to 
indicate that many more are warranted, a multitude of legal and practical 
factors do function to make it extremely difficult for juveniles to bring 
and prevail on IAC claims. The remaining Sections in this Part consider 
these impediments. 
D. Doctrinal and Systemic Impediments 
Among the most significant barriers to bringing and prevailing on a 
meritorious IAC claim is the Strickland standard.186 This case governs adult 
and juvenile IAC practice.187 The Strickland test has facilitated extremely 
deferential appellate review of trial attorney performance—so deferential 
that for sixteen years after the decision was issued, the Supreme Court 
failed to find ineffective assistance in a single case.188 In considering the 
test’s first prong, lower courts hearing IAC claims are instructed by 
Strickland to presume that conduct of trial counsel falls within the “wide 
range of reasonable professional assistance.”189 This presumption is 
strongest where counsel can justify what appear to be questionable 
actions as “strategy” or “tactics.”190  
 
juveniles harmed by deficient representation may not, for any number of reasons, 
seek to pursue an appeal—they may wish to simply put the incident behind them, or 
they may never learn of their right to appeal, to name two of the most obvious. 
Criminal law scholars have similarly suggested that the rate of substandard 
representation in adult criminal court significantly outpaces the number of IAC 
claims. Primus, supra note 17, at 683–84 & n.23 (summarizing judicial opinions and 
commentary noting the relatively low numbers of ineffective assistance of counsel 
claims). 
186 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). 
187 As developed further infra, Strickland is based on the Sixth Amendment, and 
not the Due Process Clause, which anchors the juvenile right to counsel. The case did 
not discuss delinquency cases at all. Thus, it is not clear that Strickland need be the 
governing standard. Yet a Westlaw search of published opinions pertaining to juvenile 
delinquency appeals did not reveal that any litigant had raised a challenge to the use 
of the Strickland standard as a means of assessing ineffective assistance of counsel.  
188 John H. Blume & Stacey D. Neumann, “It’s Like Deja Vu All Over Again”: 
Williams v. Taylor, Wiggins v. Smith, Rompilla v. Beard and a (Partial) Return to the 
Guidelines Approach to the Effective Assistance of Counsel, 34 AM. J. CRIM. L. 127, 133–34 
(2007). See, e.g., Burger v. Kemp, 483 U.S. 776, 788–90, 794, 813 (1987) (finding no 
ineffective assistance of counsel where capital defense counsel presented no 
mitigating case whatsoever at his sentencing hearing, conducted almost no 
investigation to prepare for the sentencing hearing, met with the defendant for only 
about six hours to prepare for both the guilt and the sentencing phases of the trial, 
and failed to uncover any of the evidence later uncovered by habeas counsel of the 
defendant’s extremely abusive family and his own psychological problems); Darden v. 
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 168, 186–87 (1986) (finding no ineffective assistance of 
counsel). In 2000, the Supreme Court ended the drought. Williams v. Taylor, 529 
U.S. 362, 395–99 (2000) (poor preparation for sentencing phase constituted 
ineffective assistance).  
189 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
190 Id. (“[A reviewing] court must indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s 
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance; that is, the 
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The second prong, which obligates defendants to demonstrate “a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the 
result of the proceeding would have been different,”191 has proven as 
difficult to meet as the first, if not more so.192 Where a reviewing court 
believes a prosecutor’s case to have been strong, even a showing of 
egregiously deficient representation will not win the defendant a new 
trial.193 In fact, the ruling in Strickland allows appellate courts to forego 
any assessment of attorney performance whatsoever and move directly to 
evaluation of the prejudice requirement.194 This requirement 
problematically places defendants in a logical bind: Where trial counsel 
failed to do adequate factual investigation, file motions or consult with 
experts, defendants cannot establish whether or how the outcome might 
have been different. What might have been exculpatory evidence is not 
found or indeed even sought.195 In this way, the prejudice requirement 
works as a demand for the defendant to demonstrate factual 
innocence.196 
The Court’s reasons for creating such a deferential test for 
measuring effective assistance were instrumentalist ones: concern that a 
less deferential test would open the floodgates for appeals of unhappy 
convicted defendants, as well as a fear that more exacting scrutiny would 
discourage attorneys from accepting appointed cases.197 The Court 
 
defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the 
challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’”). See, e.g., Cable v. 
State, 540 So. 2d 769, 774 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985) (finding that defendant did not 
meet burden of showing professional error or prejudice on three claims of ineffective 
assistance of counsel because attorney’s failure to move for suppression of search 
evidence was “an exercise of reasonable professional judgment”).  
191 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.  
192 Stephen B. Bright, The Death Penalty and the Society We Want, 6 PIERCE L. REV. 
369, 374 n.16 (2008) (“[E]ven when a defendant receives deficient representation, 
the conviction and sentence may be upheld based upon a reviewing court’s 
conclusion that it did not matter all that much.”). 
193 For an argument that appellate efforts to scrutinize a trial record resulting in 
conviction are subject to confirmatory biases whereby guilty verdicts appear 
inevitable, see Stephanos Bibas, The Psychology of Hindsight and After-the-Fact Review of 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 2004 UTAH L. REV. 1, 2 (2004). 
194 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697.  
195 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.10(d), at 671 (5th ed. 
2009) (“[I]n case after case alleging that counsel’s factual investigation was 
inadequate, the standard response is that there has been no showing of prejudice 
because defendant has failed to establish exactly what further evidence existed for 
counsel to discover if he had investigated more thoroughly.”). 
196 See, e.g., Vanessa Merton, What to Do When You Meet a “Walking Violation of the 
Sixth Amendment” if You’re Trying to Put that Lawyer’s Client in Jail? 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 
997, 1024 n.69 (2000) (“In effect, Strickland means that the ‘factually guilty’ 
defendant does not deserve the same right to effective assistance of counsel as the 
‘innocent’ defendant.”). 
197 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689–90. As Carol Steiker and Jordan Steiker explain, 
“[t]he Court was remarkably candid about its fear of opening the floodgates of 
litigation and the unfairness of evaluating attorney decision-making with the benefit 
of hindsight. Thus, the Court refused to create any ‘checklist’ of specific minimum 
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bolstered these policy considerations with this doctrinal pronouncement: 
“[T]he purpose of the effective assistance guarantee of the Sixth 
Amendment is not to improve the quality of legal representation, 
although that is a goal of considerable importance to the legal system. 
The purpose is simply to ensure that criminal defendants receive a fair 
trial.”198 As a result of the deferential test created by Strickland, 
ineffectiveness claims have failed where the trial attorney has been 
asleep,199 drunk or on drugs,200 unprepared,201 or utterly inept.202 Strickland 
has been toothless.203  
In addition to the difficulty of meeting the Strickland standard, 
several other factors impede the filing of IAC claims on behalf of 
juveniles. For one, some defender offices create a strong potential for 
 
requirements for adequate representation and exhorted lower courts to accord a 
‘strong presumption’ of adequacy of representation and to give deference to attorney 
strategy.” Carol S. Steiker & Jordan M. Steiker, Opening a Window or Building a Wall? 
The Effect of Eighth Amendment Death Penalty Law and Advocacy on Criminal Justice More 
Broadly, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 192 (2008) (footnotes omitted). 
198 Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. 
199 See McFarland v. State, 928 S.W.2d 482, 505 & nn.19–20 (Tex. Crim. App. 
1996) (holding that seventy-two-year-old lawyer in capital case who said he 
“customarily take[s] a short nap in the afternoon” was not ineffective where napping 
might have been a “strategic” move to generate jury sympathy and where co-counsel 
remained awake). 
200 See People v. Garrison, 765 P.2d 419, 440 (Cal. 1989). See also, Frye v. Lee, 235 
F.3d 897, 907 (4th Cir. 2000) (admitting the court was troubled by defense counsel’s 
“decades-long routine of drinking approximately twelve ounces of rum each evening” 
but denying ineffective assistance claim where there was no showing of specific 
instances of defective performance); Gardner v. Dixon, No. 92-4013, 1992 U.S. App. 
LEXIS 28147, at *17–36 (4th Cir. Oct. 21, 1992) (per curiam) (refusing to vacate 
petitioner’s death sentence where petitioner had several affidavits demonstrating 
counsel was severely addicted to cocaine and alcohol and used both substances 
throughout trial because evidence was not newly discovered and defendant made no 
showing that trial would have resulted in a different outcome absent the drug and 
alcohol use); Berry v. King, 765 F.2d 451, 454 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding that regardless 
of whether or not counsel used drugs during trial, “under Strickland, the fact that an 
attorney used drugs is not, in and of itself, relevant to an ineffective assistance 
claim”). See generally Kirchmeier, supra note 14, at 427.  
201 Thomas v. Kemp, 796 F.2d 1322, 1324 (11th Cir. 1986) (sentencing 
schizophrenic youth to death despite his lawyer’s failure to present evidence of 
mental impairment because denial of assistance of counsel was harmless error). 
202 See generally, Stephen B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The Death Sentence Not for the 
Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 YALE L.J. 1835, 1839 & nn.31–33 (1994) 
(describing Birt v. Montgomery, 725 F.2d 587 (11th Cir. 1984), where defense attorney 
in capital case was asked to name a criminal law case but could name only Miranda 
and Dred Scott). An abundance of scholarship condemns the Strickland standard as too 
lax to ensure effective assistance. See generally, Gary Goodpaster, The Adversary System, 
Advocacy, and Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 59 (1986); Klein, supra note 14, at 1467; Kirchmeier, supra note 14, at 427; 
Rigg, supra note 14. 
203 Bibas, supra note 193, at 6 (“Strickland winds up being almost as toothless as 
rational-basis review under the Equal Protection Clause, which also rests on post hoc 
rationalizations instead of actual reasons.”).  
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conflict of interest when they assign an appellate attorney to represent a 
client where that client was represented by an attorney from the same 
office at the trial level.204 An attorney is extremely unlikely to raise a claim 
of ineffective assistance against herself or someone in her office.205 While 
many appellate defender offices instruct an appellate attorney to 
withdraw if she believes there may be IAC issues in the record, self-
protective psychological biases might well make it difficult for the 
appellate attorney to recognize or admit that her own conduct at the trial 
level might constitute a legitimate instance of IAC.206  
Second, an appellate court is limited on direct appeal to reviewing 
the trial record,207 and while there are cases in which IAC is so clear from 
the trial record that a child could win on direct appeal,208 much of what 
constitutes ineffective assistance for juveniles occurs outside of the trial. 
Defense counsel’s failure to investigate, and some conflicts of interest, for 
example, are not issues that would be apparent from the trial record. An 
 
204 See, e.g., Burns v. Gammon, 173 F.3d 1089, 1092 (8th Cir. 1999) (where direct 
appeal will raise issue of ineffectiveness, conflict of interest exists if appellate attorney 
is same, or from the same office, as trial counsel).  
205 Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 502–03 (2003) (concluding that in the 
habeas context “ineffective-assistance claims usually should be excused from 
procedural-default rules because an attorney who handles both trial and appeal is 
unlikely to raise an ineffective-assistance claim against himself.”). 
206 United States v. Del Muro, 87 F.3d 1078, 1080 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that 
the defendant had a Sixth Amendment right to be represented by new counsel, since 
trial counsel would have an inherent conflict of interest in vigorously advocating the 
interests of his client). 
207 Some jurisdictions allow for ineffective assistance claims that pertain to issues 
outside the record by allowing for direct appeals; however, this is not the majority 
rule. Primus, supra note 17, at 680. See Commonwealth v. Grant, 813 A.2d 726, 734–36 
(Pa. 2002) (surveying federal and state jurisdictions and summarizing general rule 
that only claims that can be adequately reviewed on the existing record may be 
brought on direct appeal).  
208 There are numerous cases in which the “deficient performance” prong of 
Strickland was satisfied by a lawyer’s failure to make what would have been a 
meritorious objection at trial. See, e.g., Girts v. Yanai, 501 F.3d 743, 756–57 (6th Cir. 
2007) (concluding “[t]his inaction simply cannot be characterized as litigation 
strategy” when trial counsel committed ineffective assistance by failing to object to 
prosecutor’s closing argument references to accused’s constitutionally protected 
silence); Ege v. Yukins, 485 F.3d 364, 378–79 (6th Cir. 2007) (defense counsel was 
ineffective, thereby supplying “cause,” by failing to object to lack of proper 
foundation for prosecution bite-mark expert’s testimony); Martin v. Grosshans, 424 
F.3d 588, 591 (7th Cir. 2005) (“[D]efense counsel performed deficiently for failing to 
make the proper objections” to inadmissible, prejudicial testimony by prosecution 
witnesses and “for failing to move for a mistrial after the prosecution’s [improper and 
prejudicial] closing argument”); Cox v. Donnelly, 387 F.3d 193, 199–200 (2d Cir. 
2004) (“Where counsel . . . repeatedly fails to object to a clearly unconstitutional 
charge on the key issue in a criminal case” and where the state’s characterization of 
counsel’s conduct as “deliberate tactic” is “implausible,” the state court’s “rejection of 
an ineffectiveness claim . . . simply cannot be viewed as reasonable”); Washington v. 
Hofbauer, 228 F.3d 689, 702 (6th Cir. 2000) (“This Court has on several occasions 
found that a counsel’s failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct constitutes 
defective performance . . . .”). 
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adjudicated delinquent would have to raise an IAC claim based on these 
issues in a collateral, post-conviction proceeding,209 yet few states appoint 
post-conviction counsel to juveniles or adults.210 Furthermore, a number 
of states require that a juvenile must be in state custody in order to raise a 
claim of ineffective assistance via a state post-conviction proceeding, so 
unless a juvenile’s attorney’s ineffectiveness is apparent from the record, 
the un-incarcerated juvenile may not file an IAC claim.211 
Third, there is no guarantee that an attorney appointed to appeal a 
conviction or sentence, whether on direct appeal or collateral 
proceedings, will perform any better than trial counsel.212 While the 
Supreme Court has held that criminal defendants are entitled to effective 
assistance in pursuing their direct appeals,213 no state or federal court has 
 
209 Primus, supra note 17, at 680. Failing to raise an IAC claim on direct appeal 
does not bar the claim from being brought in a post-conviction, collateral 
proceeding. See Massaro, 538 U.S. at 504.  
210 The Supreme Court has held that a state is not required to appoint counsel to 
represent indigent defendants in collateral attacks on their convictions and 
sentences. Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1989); Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 
U.S. 551, 556–57 (1987). While McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 859 (1994), made 
appointed counsel mandatory for all indigent capital prisoners in federal habeas 
corpus proceedings, most states do not provide for attorneys in non-capital cases. See 
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 752 (1991) (right to appointed counsel does 
not extend to appeal from state habeas trial court judgment); Finley, 481 U.S. at 555; 
United States v. Prows, 448 F.3d 1223, 1229 (10th Cir. 2006) (right to counsel does 
not extend to post-conviction proceedings); Lopez v. Wilson, 426 F.3d 339, 340–41, 
352 (6th Cir. 2005) (right to appointed counsel does not extend to application to 
reopen case because of ineffective assistance of appellate counsel, because such 
motion is collateral rather than direct review); United States v. Harrington, 410 F.3d 
598, 600 (9th Cir. 2005) (right to counsel does not extend to petitioner’s motion for 
new trial after completion of direct appeal and habeas petition); United States v. 
Berger, 375 F.3d 1223, 1227 (11th Cir. 2004) (right to appointed counsel does not 
extend to post-conviction, post-appeal Rule 33 motion); Rouse v. Lee, 339 F.3d 238, 
250 (4th Cir. 2003) (right to appointed counsel does not extend to federal habeas 
proceedings); United States v. Riggs, 314 F.3d 796, 799 (5th Cir. 2002) (right to 
appointed counsel does not extend to post-conviction proceedings); Ellis v. United 
States, 313 F.3d 636, 652–53 (1st Cir. 2002) (right to appointed counsel does not 
extend to habeas proceedings); McKethan v. Mantello, 292 F.3d 119, 123 (2d Cir. 
2002) (right to appointed counsel does not extend to state collateral proceedings); 
Reagan v. Norris, 279 F.3d 651, 656 (8th Cir. 2002) (right to counsel does not extend 
to post-conviction proceedings “because such proceedings are usually civil in 
nature”).  
211 See, e.g., Mason v. State, 914 S.W.2d 751, 751–52 (Ark. 1996) (holding that 
since child’s guilty plea resulted in probation, minor not permitted to raise 
ineffective assistance of counsel). Habeas proceedings in federal court have more 
relaxed requirements; rather than requiring actual custody, federal law holds that 
anyone who, “as a result of action by a state or federal criminal court, is ‘subject to 
restraints not shared by the public generally’” meets the “‘status’ jurisdictional 
requirement in the habeas corpus statute.” RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL 
HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 8.2a, at 392–93 (5th ed. 2005) (internal 
quotations omitted) (quoting Hensley v. Mun. Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973)). 
212 See Bright, supra note 192, at 374. 
213 Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387, 396 (1985). 
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required that the assistance of counsel provided in any collateral attack 
on a conviction, adjudication, sentence, or disposition be constitutionally 
effective assistance.214 
In addition to the obstacles that prevent juveniles from filing claims 
of IAC, additional disincentives exist for lawyers to appeal delinquency 
cases on any grounds whatsoever.215 While nearly all states now provide a 
right to appeal, most of them do not provide for an attorney to help a 
child exercise that right.216 Douglas v. California establishes that where a 
state provides for the right to appeal, equal protection requires it to 
provide counsel for indigent appellants;217 this case would appear to apply 
with equal force in juvenile court. However, in a 1995 survey, thirty-two 
percent of juvenile public defenders stated they were not authorized to 
handle appeals. Only one in five attorneys took any appeals the previous 
year.218 Because Gault did not hold that a child has a constitutionally 
protected right to appeal, states may lawfully deny them the right to 
appeal as well. And while, under Douglas, it would appear that if they 
provide the right to appeal they must provide appellate counsel, in many 
instances counsel is not in fact being provided.  
While some states fund public defender agencies, which can elect to 
appoint counsel to appeal delinquency cases, these agencies tend not to 
prioritize juvenile appeals in determining how to allocate their scarce 
appellate resources,219 so unless a youth adjudicated delinquent takes the 
initiative to contact the local public defender to request representation, 
his appellate rights are unlikely to be actualized. Additionally, some state 
provisions allow for the state to recoup costs from the family of a juvenile 
 
214 See Finley, 481 U.S. at 555 (holding that there is no right to effective assistance 
of counsel in state collateral proceedings). Cf. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 617–18 
(1974) (holding that no right to effective assistance of counsel exists when seeking a 
discretionary appeal following an appeal of right). 
215 See, e.g., Donald J. Harris, Due Process vs. Helping Kids in Trouble: Implementing the 
Right to Appeal from Adjudications of Delinquency in Pennsylvania, 98 DICK. L. REV. 209, 
220, 228 (1994) (reporting that public defenders filed about ten times as many 
appeals for adult defendants as for delinquents and attributing the differences to 
juvenile defense lawyers’ internalization of parens patriae ideology); Patricia Puritz & 
Wendy Shang, Juvenile Indigent Defense: Crisis and Solutions, CRIM. JUST., Spring 2000, at 
22, 23 (reporting that public defenders and court appointed counsel rarely, if ever, 
file appeals). 
216 Those states with statutes providing for counsel to juveniles on appeal are: 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-325 (2007); IOWA CODE ANN. § 232.133 (West 2006) (as 
interpreted by Chambers v. Dist. Court of Dubuque County, 152 N.W.2d 818, 820 
(Iowa 1967)); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 3404 (2003); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:4A-39 
(West 1987); N.M. R. ANN. 10-251 (2009); TENN. R. JUV. P. 36 (2009); TEX. FAM. CODE 
ANN. § 56.01 (Vernon 2009); and WYO. STAT. ANN. § 14-6-233 (2009).  
217 372 U.S. 353, 357–58 (1993). 
218 See PATRICIA PURITZ ET AL., ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR., A CALL FOR JUSTICE: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF ACCESS TO COUNSEL AND QUALITY OF REPRESENTATION IN DELINQUENCY 
PROCEEDINGS 10 (1995). See generally Marrus, supra note 125. 
219 See Puritz & Shang, supra note 215, at 23; Harris, supra note 215, at 220, 224. 
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whose appeal is unsuccessful.220 Such rules create sharp disincentives for 
children to bring an appeal based on any ground. Appellate defender 
attorneys and organizations may not prioritize juvenile appeals in part 
because of a perception that the stakes are insufficiently high. 
Delinquency adjudications result in relatively short sentences overall, as 
compared with adult criminal defendants.221 The average amount of time 
it takes for an appeal—adult or juvenile—to make its way through the 
appeals process is four years.222 The average length of a juvenile sentence 
is considerably shorter than four years223—so short as to create a 
disincentive for adjudicated delinquents to bother with an appeal.224 Yet, 
as argued above in Part III.B, collateral consequences make adjudications 
harmful to the child in the long run, suggesting that the better practice 
would be for juveniles with meritorious IAC claims to consider seeking 
counsel to file them.  
V. REMEDYING THE REMEDY 
It seems clear that juveniles harmed by deficient representation do 
not at present have a meaningful legal remedy in ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims. In order to ensure that juveniles have the means to file 
appropriate IAC claims, several reforms addressing the practical and 
legal impediments discussed in Part III must occur. The remainder of the 
Article will offer some preliminary thoughts toward reform.  
State legislatures and judiciaries must take steps to ensure that 
provisions are made for juveniles to exercise the right to appeal granted 
by every state.225 Only some states require that a child be informed of the 
 
220 See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 7A-450.1 (2007) (providing for payment by parent 
or guardian unless juvenile prevails on appeal). “It is the intent of the General 
Assembly that, whenever possible, if an attorney or guardian ad litem is appointed 
pursuant to G.S. 7A-451 for a person who is less than 18 years old or who is at least 18 
years old but remains dependent on and domiciled with a parent or guardian, the 
parent, guardian, or any trustee in possession of funds or property for the benefit of 
the person, shall reimburse the State for the attorney or guardian ad litem fees, 
pursuant to the procedures established in G.S. 7A-450.2 and G.S. 7A-450.3. This 
section shall not apply in any case in which the person for whom an attorney or 
guardian ad litem is appointed prevails.” Id.  
221 See OFFICE OF JUVENILE JUSTICE & DELINQUENCY PREVENTION, STATISTICAL 
BRIEFING BOOK: JUVENILES IN CORRECTIONS (2008), http://ojjdp.ncjrs.gov/ojstatbb/ 
corrections/qa08405.asp (see Custody Data) [hereinafter STATISTICAL BRIEFING 
BOOK]. 
222 See Primus, supra note 17, at 693 (noting average length of appeal and 
comparing it to length of appellate process). 
223 See STATISTICAL BRIEFING BOOK, supra note 221.  
224 See Judith B. Jones, Access to Counsel, JUV. JUST. BULL. (Office of Justice 
Programs, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Wash., D.C.), June 2004, at 5–6, 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ojjdp/204063.pdf. (noting the dilemma facing 
juvenile defenders seeking to file appeals when clients have relatively short sentences, 
yet the appellate process is long and the juvenile court unlikely to stay a disposition 
pending appeal).  
225 See Arkin, supra note 167, at 513–14. 
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right.226 The right is nearly meaningless if they are not told about it and 
not provided an attorney to pursue it. A fourteen-year-old cannot be 
expected to know that she can ask a reviewing court to consider errors at 
trial or in her plea, and she certainly cannot navigate the complex rules 
of appellate procedure on her own.227 Therefore, court rules must be 
enacted that require judges to inform juveniles of their right to appeal 
upon resolution of their cases. Additionally, juveniles should be entitled 
to expedite appeals, given that the length of time it typically takes to 
prosecute an appeal exceeds the average juvenile sentence. Jurisdictions 
should abandon or modify the in-custody requirement for state post-
conviction claims for the same reason.228  
 
226 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-202(f)(1)(c)(3) (LexisNexis Supp. 2009) 
(requiring the child’s attorney to advise him or her in language they can understand 
on whether to appeal a court decision); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-325(B) (2007) 
(“Immediately after an order of disposition the juvenile hearing officer shall advise 
the juvenile that a right to appeal exists, the applicable time limit and the location 
and manner of filing the notice of appeal.”); CAL. R. CT. 5.590 (2009) (“In juvenile 
court proceedings in which the child is found to be a person described by section 
300, 601, or 602 after a contested issue of fact or law, the juvenile court, after making 
its order at the conclusion of the dispositional hearing or an order changing or 
modifying a previous disposition at the conclusion of a hearing on a supplemental 
petition, will advise, either orally or in writing, the child and, if present, the child’s 
parent, guardian, or adult relative of any right to appeal from such order, of the 
necessary steps and time for taking an appeal, and of the right of an indigent person 
to have counsel appointed by the reviewing court.”); ILL. CT. R. & P. 605(a)–(b) 
(2009) (Defendant in a juvenile court proceeding to be notified of right to appeal 
after entering a plea); MISS. CODE ANN. § 43-21-557(1) (West 2008) (“At the 
beginning of each adjudicatory hearing, the youth court shall . . . explain to the 
parties . . . the right to appeal.”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 43-279.01(1)(g) (2008) (“[T]he 
court shall inform the parties of the . . . [r]ight to appeal and have a transcript or 
record of the proceedings for such purpose.”); OHIO R. JUV. P. 34(J) (2008) (“At the 
conclusion of the hearing, the court shall advise the child of the child’s right to 
record expungement and, where any part of the proceeding was contested, advise the 
parties of their right to appeal.”); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 26-7A-30 (2004) (“The court 
shall advise the child and the child’s parents, guardian or custodian . . . [of] the right 
to appeal according to the rules of appellate procedure governing civil actions.”); 
TENN. R. JUV. P. 36(c) (2009) (“At the dispositional hearing on a petition alleging 
delinquent or unruly conduct, whether before the referee or judge and whether on a 
plea of guilty or not guilty, if the respondent is found guilty, he or she shall be 
informed of the right to appeal, the time limit for appeal, the manner in which to 
perfect an appeal, and the right to an appointed attorney on appeal if indigent.”); 
TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 56.01(e) (Vernon 2008) (“On entering an order that is 
appealable under this section, the court shall advise the child and the child’s parent, 
guardian, or guardian ad litem of the child’s rights [to appeal] listed under 
Subsection (d) of this section.”); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78A-6-1109(3) (2008) (“If the 
parties are present in the courtroom, the court shall inform them of . . . their right to 
appeal within the specified time limits . . . .”). 
227 Marrus, supra note 125, at 302. 
228 I also endorse proposals offered by would-be IAC reformers in the adult 
context, such as providing counsel for federal habeas corpus proceedings. See Emily 
Garcia Uhrig, A Case for a Constitutional Right to Counsel in Habeas Corpus, 60 HASTINGS 
L.J. 541, 544 (2009). In addition, I support proposals allowing appellate attorneys to 
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Even if such reforms were implemented, the Strickland v. Washington 
standard229 would continue to present a formidable obstacle. Yet the case 
may not forever be the obstacle it is now.  
In a trio of capital cases—Williams v. Taylor,230 Wiggins v. Smith,231 and 
Rompilla v. Beard232—the Court reversed death sentences after it found 
trial counsel ineffective for failing to conduct adequate investigation to 
prepare for the sentencing phase. Commentators agree that the amount 
and quality of investigative work in these cases was actually better than 
that performed by the trial attorney for David Strickland.233 The Court 
nevertheless held it ineffective in all three cases, distinguishing without 
overruling Strickland.234  
 
supplement the trial record in order to bring an IAC claim on direct appeal. See 
Primus, supra note 17, at 682. 
229 466 U.S. 668, 678 (1984). 
230 529 U.S. 362, 395–96 (2000) (“[C]ounsel did not begin to prepare for [the 
sentencing] phase . . . until a week before the trial . . . failed to conduct an 
investigation that would have uncovered extensive records graphically describing 
Williams’ nightmarish childhood, . . . failed to introduce available evidence that 
Williams was ‘borderline mentally retarded’ and did not advance beyond sixth grade 
in school . . . [and] failed to seek prison records recording Williams’ commendations 
for [good conduct while in prison]. . . . [T]rial counsel did not fulfill their obligation 
to conduct a thorough investigation of the defendant’s background.”). 
231 539 U.S. 510, 528, 534 (2003) (trial lawyers’ limited investigation of mitigating 
evidence violates petitioner’s right to effective assistance of counsel at the capital 
sentencing phase notwithstanding counsel’s claim of “strategic decision” to curtail 
investigation and concentrate on other types of appeals to sentencing jury, when 
attorneys’ “decision to end their investigation when they did was neither consistent 
with the professional standards that prevailed . . . [at the time of sentencing], nor 
reasonable in light of the evidence counsel uncovered in the social services records—
evidence that would have led a reasonably competent attorney to investigate 
further”). 
232 545 U.S. 374, 377, 383, 385–86, 390 (2005) (trial attorney was “deficient in 
failing to examine the court file on Rompilla’s prior conviction,” given that the 
“prosecution was going to use the dramatic facts of a similar prior offense, and 
[accordingly] Rompilla’s counsel had a duty to make all reasonable efforts to learn 
what they could about the offense . . . [which] certainly included obtaining the 
Commonwealth’s own readily available file on the prior conviction to learn what the 
Commonwealth knew about the crime, to discover any mitigating evidence the 
Commonwealth would downplay, and to anticipate the details of the aggravating 
evidence the Commonwealth would emphasize,” and that all of this was true even 
when, as in this case, the “capital defendant’s family members and the defendant 
himself have suggested that no mitigating evidence is available, his lawyer is bound to 
make reasonable efforts to obtain and review material that counsel knows the 
prosecution will probably rely on as evidence of aggravation at the sentencing phase 
of trial” and that trial counsel’s omission was prejudicial in that review of file would 
have revealed a “range of mitigation leads that no other source had opened up.”).  
233 See, e.g., Gregory J. O’Meara, The Name is the Same but the Facts Have Been 
Changed to Protect the Attorneys: Strickland, Judicial Discretion, and Appellate Decision-
Making, 42 VAL. U. L. REV. 687, 687 (2008) (“[C]ounsel in both Wiggins and Rompilla 
did far more than trial counsel in Strickland v. Washington, where the Court found 
counsel’s representation to be effective under the Constitution.”). 
234 Blume & Neumann, supra note 188, at 129. 
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In each of the cases, the Court elevated in importance the ABA 
Standards for Criminal Justice as a benchmark for assessing whether trial 
counsel’s failure to conduct a comprehensive sentencing investigation 
was reasonable.235 In Strickland, Justice O’Connor had rejected the notion 
that trial counsel’s performance should be measured against ABA 
standards, admonishing that they were simply to function as guides to 
determine reasonableness.236 In Wiggins, by contrast, Justice O’Connor 
referred to ABA standards as “well-defined norms;” trial counsel’s 
departure from the standards by failing to investigate constituted 
ineffective assistance.237 While the doctrinal shift signified by the Williams-
Wiggins-Rompilla trilogy has done nothing to alter the problematic 
“prejudice” prong of Strickland,238 it does appear to have given the 
attorney-performance prong teeth, at least in the sentencing phases of 
capital cases.239 The fact that Williams, Wiggins, and Rompilla all employ 
the ABA Standards as the benchmark against which to measure 
objectively reasonable representation bolsters the argument that juvenile 
trial-level lawyering must comport with accepted professional standards 
to be considered effective.240  
 
235 Id. 
236 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
237 Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003). In Bobby v. Van Hook, the U.S. 
Supreme Court found that the Sixth Circuit had improperly relied on ABA 
Guidelines in finding the representation of an attorney in the sentencing phase of a 
capital case ineffective. Bobby v. Van Hook, 130 S. Ct. 13 (2009) (per curiam) (citing 
ABA, GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN 
DEATH PENALTY CASES (2003), available at http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/ 
downloads/sclaid/indigentdefense/deathpenaltyguidelines2003.pdf). However, this 
case does not overrule Wiggins.  
238 Adam M. Gershowitz, Get In the Game or Get Out of the Way: Fixing the Politics of 
Death, 94 VA. L. REV. IN BRIEF 51, 53 (2008), http://www.virginialawreview.org/ 
inbrief/2008/09/29/gershowitz.pdf (arguing that Williams-Wiggins-Rompilla trilogy, in 
failing to alter prejudice requirement, does little to ensure effective assistance of 
counsel). 
239 Scholars are divided over whether these cases will have any impact outside the 
capital context. See, e.g., Stephen F. Smith, The Supreme Court and the Politics of Death, 
94 VA. L. REV. 283, 355 (2008); Jenny Roberts, Too Little, Too Late: Ineffective Assistance 
of Counsel, the Duty to Investigate, and Pretrial Discovery in Criminal Cases, 31 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 1097, 1117–20 (2004) (arguing that results in these cases reflect an 
evolution in the Court’s view of the centrality of investigation in defense lawyering 
brought about by high-profile exonerations of death-row prisoners whose attorneys 
had conducted no or minimal investigation). But see Carissa Byrne Hessick, Ineffective 
Assistance at Sentencing, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1069, 1111 (2009) (arguing that these cases can 
and should apply in non-capital sentencing). 
240 Ellen Marrus argues that the first prong of Strickland makes IAC claims in 
juvenile delinquency cases nearly impossible to make. She suggests that because the 
overall level of performance in juvenile court is low, and is in many instances 
dominated by attorneys practicing “best-interests” lawyering, in which they substitute 
their own judgment for that of their own clients, that reviewing courts would find that 
sub-par representation is actually consistent with professional norms. Marrus, supra 
note 9, at 417–20. However, Wiggins, decided after Marrus’s article, appears to suggest 
that the first prong of Strickland can be decided against professional standards, rather 
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While Strickland, particularly as it has been modified by Williams, 
Wiggins, and Rompilla, need not be a barrier to the filing of IAC claims, it 
is worth noting in closing that it is not clear that Strickland need be the 
standard that is applied to juvenile ineffective assistance of counsel claims 
in any event. As noted above, the juvenile right to counsel is premised on 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, while the adult 
right to counsel is premised on the Sixth Amendment. The due process 
grounding of the juvenile right to counsel—along with the different, 
more rehabilitative purpose of juvenile court—creates an opening for an 
appellate attorney to argue that the two-prong test of Strickland is not the 
appropriate standard for measuring juvenile IAC claims. 241  
Commentators have proposed many alternatives to the Strickland test 
in the adult context.242 A variation on one such alternative that would be 
appropriate in the juvenile context is one proposed by Judge David 
Bazelon in United States v. DeCoster.243 In that case, decided eleven years 
before Strickland, Judge Bazelon essentially adopted the ABA Standards as 
a constitutional benchmark for evaluating the provision of effective 
assistance. He proposed that if a defendant could establish a violation of 
those standards by trial counsel, the burden would shift to the 
government to establish lack of prejudice on the eventual outcome.244 A 
juvenile-appropriate alternative to Strickland would, like Judge Bazelon’s 
test in DeCoster, eliminate or modify Strickland’s prejudice requirement. 
The reason for the change would be different from the reasons 
motivating proposals in the adult context, which focus on the “hindsight 
bias” of reviewing courts that make convictions appear inevitable that in 
fact might have been avoided with competent trial counsel,245 or the fact 
that the prejudice requirement functions as a demand that the 
defendant/appellant essentially demonstrate that he is factually 
innocent.246  
A juvenile-appropriate IAC standard would eliminate or modify the 
prejudice requirement because the goals of juvenile court—as 
recognized by Gault and again in every subsequent Supreme Court case 
addressing the requirements of due process in delinquency 
 
than simply against the lowest common denominator of attorney performance. See 
Wiggins, 539 U.S. 510.  
241 See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963) (noting that due 
process is “a concept less rigid and more fluid than those envisaged in other specific 
and particular provisions of the Bill of Rights”); Cafeteria & Rest. Workers Union, 
Local 473 v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961) (establishing fluidity of due process).  
242 See, e.g., William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland’s Tin Horn: Doctrinal and 
Practical Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 91, 168–70 
(1995) (summarizing alternatives to Strickland).  
243 DeCoster I, 487 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
244 Id. at 1203–04. The District of Columbia Circuit Court, sitting en banc, 
rejected Bazelon’s proposal in a lengthy opinion. United States v. DeCoster (DeCoster 
II), 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1976). 
245 Bibas, supra note 193, at 2. 
246 Merton, supra note 196, at 1025. 
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proceedings—include rehabilitation,247 and, again as recognized in Gault, 
a child’s ability to invest in his rehabilitation is premised on his 
perception that he was treated fairly. That is, the process of the 
delinquency proceeding may be as significant for a juvenile’s 
rehabilitation as its outcome. Thus, whether or not the deficient 
representation affected the fact-finder’s decision that the juvenile was 
delinquent is not the only, or even necessarily the most significant, 
inquiry that a reviewing court should undertake in evaluating whether 
the representation was ineffective.248 Even if the deficient representation 
did not affect the factual finding of guilt or innocence, if it thwarted the 
juvenile’s rehabilitation, it may nevertheless have been constitutionally 
ineffective—or so one could argue in appropriate cases.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
Child advocates and scholars have long documented the need for 
more zealous representation of juveniles. They have called for increased 
salaries, lower caseloads, increased training for attorneys, an end to the 
practice of assigning the most inexperienced practitioners to juvenile 
court, and judicial training on the importance of expressed-interest 
lawyering.249 Comparatively less attention has been paid to the need for 
increased access to appellate advocacy, particularly to the juvenile’s 
ability to file IAC claims, as a means of ensuring system-wide reform. Yet 
IAC claims do have a role to play in this regard. 
IAC claims also can have some impact, however limited, on the 
system-wide problem of deficient representation in four principal ways:250 
 
247 Today, a few state purpose clauses focus primarily on child welfare goals, while 
other states weigh public safety, punishment, and deterrence goals. Most states, 
however, adopt a balanced approach that addresses public safety but also addresses a 
youth’s rehabilitation. SNYDER & SICKMUND, supra note 5, at 97. 
248 The Due Process undergirding of the juvenile right to counsel could facilitate 
such an argument. As Professor Tracey Meares has argued, early criminal procedure 
cases decided under the Due Process Clause emphasized the importance of public 
perceptions of fairness in the criminal justice system. See Tracey L. Meares, Everything 
Old Is New Again: Fundamental Fairness and the Legitimacy of Criminal Justice, 3 OHIO ST. 
J. CRIM. L. 105, 111–14 (2005). In such cases, defendants were entitled to reversals of 
their convictions where “fundamental principles of justice and liberty” were 
ignored—in spite of evidence (sometimes strong) of guilt. Id. at 111. While the Due 
Process Clause has almost completely given way to the specific guarantees of the Bill 
of Rights in the adult criminal context in assessments of whether prosecutions are 
constitutional or not, it continues to govern appellate analysis of juvenile 
proceedings. As such, what Professor Meares describes as the “public-regarding” 
elements of due process could lead to a different view of whether an attorney in a 
delinquency case performed effectively than the Strickland analysis, through which a 
lack of demonstrated prejudice to the juvenile can doom an IAC claim. Id. at 106, 
111–14. 
249 See, e.g., ABA JUVENILE JUSTICE CTR. & MID-ATL. JUVENILE DEFENDER CTR., supra 
note 111. 
250 Thanks to Randy Hertz for helping me develop this insight on the systemic 
role that IAC litigation can play. 
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(1) establishing a standard of professional conduct, albeit a floor of what 
is constitutionally permissible conduct rather than a ceiling of zealous 
advocacy; (2) deterring actionable misconduct through the setting of 
these norms; (3) performing a signaling251 function for attorneys that 
delinquency practice is a serious one; and (4) identifying those lawyers 
who have practiced ineffectively and who should therefore be considered 
for removal from the panel of court-appointed lawyers.252  
For those reasons, everyone who cares about Gault’s promise that 
children, through legal representation, must be treated fairly and with 
dignity, should also be concerned with the inadequacy of IAC claims to 
ensure that attorneys achieve those results for their clients. 
 
251  See generally Lissa Lamkin Broome & Kimberly D. Krawiec, Signaling Through 
Board Diversity: Is Anyone Listening?, 77 U. CIN. L. REV. 431, 447 (2009) (describing 
signaling theory and applying it to broad diversity in corporation). 
252 An argument can be made that even if IAC claims were filed on behalf of 
aggrieved juveniles at a rate commensurate with ineffective assistance, it would be at 
best a weak form of redress for the individual who was harmed. Appeals take years to 
wind through the courts, and by the time an IAC claim is heard, the impact of the 
harm—a probation period or even an incarcerating sentence, for example—has 
dissipated. And even when a juvenile “wins” on the basis of IAC, the remedy is at best 
either a retrial or resentencing. See James S. Liebman, The Overproduction of Death, 100 
COLUM. L. REV. 2030, 2120–21 (2000) (discussing the inadequacy of appellate 
procedure in relation to death penalty cases). 
